The Impact of Coalitions on Waste Management Systems
Case Studies of Los Angeles and New York City

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Executive Summary

Solid waste is an unalterable part of life, but the way we dispose of it is not. Currently, the majority of waste management systems in the United States employ practices that are inefficient, contaminate our environment, negatively affect communities and exploit their workers. The amount of waste we are creating is increasing, meaning many cities must review their solid waste management systems and create more advanced systems. Most of the cities that have started this process focus on the environmental issues of waste management, though there are some that look at the system as a whole and hope to rectify all of the issues that waste management systems cause.

Current systems and issues must be situated in a historical context to fully understand the negative impacts that waste management creates today, as well as to understand the roots of the current campaigns surrounding waste management. Thus, I give a history of waste management systems and how waste became integrated with the environmental justice movement. I then provide case studies of Los Angeles and New York City, two cities that are leading breakthrough campaigns in regard to waste management. In doing so, I provide a historical background of both city’s waste management systems and an analysis of the campaigns in each city. Next, I present my findings from these
case studies, which included the importance of community organizing and community involvement, coalition building, education and changes in power.

In closing, I conclude my research noting how coalitions affect waste management systems and waste management policy. Additionally, I provide recommendations for other cities that are looking to start successful waste campaigns, specifically focusing on coalition building and system overhaul.

Introduction

In the past decade, many cities in the United States have put plans in motion that attempt to make their cities zero waste. One of the aspects of these zero waste plans is to increase recycling and composting rates. However, to do so, new solid waste systems and facilities need to be put in place so that cities can reach the goals of these plans. While some form of waste management has been in place as early as 500 BC, the evolution of productive, efficient, safe and sustainable solid waste management systems has not matched the evolution of the waste management system as a whole.

While the solid waste management system faces many issues, there are a number of non-profits and community groups throughout the country that are fighting for more sustainable, accountable and environmentally friendly solid waste management practices. As seen throughout history, the waste industry was, and still is, “the major driver of the environmental justice movement and
the academic and policy debates surrounding environmental racism (Pellow 5).

In Los Angeles, the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), a non-profit that fights for good jobs, thriving communities and a healthy environment for everyone, is leading a campaign known as the Don’t Waste LA project. In New York City, the Alliance for a Greater New York (ALIGN), a non-profit that aims to create good jobs, vibrant communities and an accountable government, is heading the new solid waste management campaign.

This paper provides case studies of Los Angeles and New York City, by comparing the cities political and physical landscape and providing an overview of the waste campaigns in these cities. In Los Angeles, the ordinance that the campaign supported and pushed was just approved and the City is currently in the implementation stage. Once implemented, the Zero Waste LA Franchise Ordinance will make Los Angeles one of the largest green cities in the country. In New York City, this process of policy reform has just begun, thus the case study focuses more on suggestions for the city as they go through this process.

This paper examines the impacts that coalitions formed from non-profit, environmental, community and labor groups have had on waste management policies in Los Angeles and New York City. Additionally, it provides insights into what aspects of the campaigns have worked in these cities and what aspects have not. Furthermore, the paper provides suggestions from the analyses of
these campaigns that can be used by cities that are building their own coalitions and starting their own waste management campaigns.

This study will be the first to complete case studies of these cities in terms of how coalitions have impacted policy in the waste management sector, and will also be the first to complete a case study of the Don’t Waste LA campaign in Los Angeles.

**Personal Involvement**

My personal involvement in waste management grew out of my internship at the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy working on the Don’t Waste LA campaign. Through the opportunity of this internship I was surprised to see how issues surrounding waste management go much deeper than just being environmental ones. From working on the campaign, I learned that here in Los Angeles problems within the waste management sector covered the span of environmental, environmental justice and labor issues.

The more I learned about waste management and the issues surrounding these systems, the more shocked I became about how labor and environmental justice issues were so intertwined. The intricacies of the system and how the system affects so many aspects of cities, people’s livelihood, politics and economics surprised me and I became more interested in learning about where these issues stemmed from, as well as what could be done to rectify the current
In response to my personal involvement with Don’t Waste LA, I became interested in what other cities across the nation were doing in regard to waste systems and waste management policy. While all cities are different geographically and have different political landscapes, I was interested in seeing whether there was one model that could be adjusted to fit any city.

**Literature Review on Waste Management**

The solid waste management system in the United States is “comprised of regulatory, administrative, market, technology, and social subcomponents” (Louis 306). Thus, to fully understand how our waste system came to be today, and to understand how we can make it better, we must look at the historical development of the solid waste management system from its start to today. Furthermore, the impact of community groups and non-profits on development, specifically during the time of the Environmental Justice movement must be explained.

The literature on waste management is extensive. It includes historical pieces written about waste management and its origins (Louis; Pellow; Rootes), articles written about community organizing and protests surrounding waste management (Rootes; Bullard and Johnson ; Rootes and Leonard; Kurtz), literature on the connection between waste management and environmental
injustice (Pellow; Krieg; Watson and Bulkeley; Petts; Martuzzi Mitis and Forastiere; Lee; Bullard and Johnson; Kurtz) and studies written on the environmental issues that waste management is causing today (Humes; Transforming Trash; Don’t Waste LA; Transform Don’t Trash NYC). A review of the literature provides historical context as to how our waste management system developed, as well as what factors affected it such as community protests around sanitation, environmental aspects and environmental racism. Furthermore, a review of the literature situates the current waste management problem to show what must be done today to update the waste management system and make the system as a whole more efficient and accountable.

The Challenge of Waste Systems

Today, Americans produce 7.1 pounds of waste per person per day, making Americans the producers of the most waste on the planet (Humes). The amount of trash that an American creates in their lifetime is equivalent to 102 tons, and while “each of our bodies may occupy only one cemetery plot when we’re done with this world [our trash] will require the equivalent of 1,100 graves” (Humes 4). In Garbology, Humes provides a sample of what goes into American landfills each year, listing numbers that are shocking. Annually, American’s send “…enough aluminum to rebuild the entire commercial air fleet four times over; enough steel to level and restore Manhattan; enough wood to heat 50 million
homes for twenty years; [and] enough plastic wrap to shrink-wrap Texas…” (Humes 15). Furthermore, most of this trash will not decompose, nor will it be recycled or reused. Instead, it will continue to be incinerated, contaminating our fresh air, or it will be buried and landfilled, exploiting our precious, scarce resource of land.

Presently, trash is very connected to our consumerist style of life (Humes; Rootes). The more people buy and consume products the more waste they generate in terms of packaging and obsolete items that they no longer use. As Humes writes,

> It turns out our contemporary economy, not to mention the current incarceration of the American Dream, is inextricably linked to an endless, accelerating accumulation of trash. The purchases that drive the markets, the products that prove the dream, all come packaged in instant trash (the boxes, wrappers, bags, ties, bottles, caps and plastic bubbles that contain produces). And what’s inside that packaging is destined to break, become obsolete, get used up or become unfashionable in a few years, months or even days— in other words, rapidly becoming trash, too (5).

This quote displays, a clear connection between developed countries with booming economies and high consumption and countries with a plethora of landfills. In countries where spending is high, there is a correlation between high spending and large amounts of waste being produced, as many things are thrown out to make room for new objects. Additionally, “with the rise in the amount of packaging in retail items, US consumers continue to generate more
solid waste per person” (Pellow 58). Humes provides a “Waste Q & A” in his book, in which he asks, “How much waste does the entire U.S. economy create to make a year’s worth of food, fuel, resource extraction and products for one American?” (Humes 95) and “How much of that total waste figure is recycled?” (Humes 95) His answers to the two questions are “Just under 1 million pounds (waste water not included)” (Humes 95) and “2 percent,” (Humes 95) respectively.

As can be deducted from the above questions and answers, Americans are barely recycling (only 2% of the nations production waste is recycles) and with all of the trash that Americans are producing, we are running out of room to put it. In Los Angeles County, Puente Hills landfill, the largest landfill in the United States, is set to close at the end of October 2013. At the height of a 40-story building, Puente Hills Landfill takes in about 7,000 tons of trash a day. With its closing, many people are asking the question, “Where are we going to put all of this trash?” (Humes 26). Humes distinguishes that this is the wrong question to ask and that this misguided question is at the basis of our trash problem. Instead, we should be asking, “Why do we have so much trash, and what can we do to make less of it?” (Humes 26). Humes hits the nail on the head with his revealing statement where he states,
'Managing’ waste is universally viewed as a positive. Everyone wants clean cities, sidewalks and streets, a healthy, sanitary environment for our kids. But our focus on managing a waste problem by making it appear to disappear has blinded many of us to the reality of how much food, fuel, water and other things of value we waste every day. For most of human history, such waste has been viewed as shameful or worse...today, however, a gluttony of consumption has become the norm (259).

The way that we look at waste and waste management today needs to change before the politics of the system can. Instead of considering our waste managed when it is out of sight, we need to look at the system as a whole, from the beginning of an items production to how it is disposed of and what that waste really says about our economy, lifestyle and environment. If people are not recognizing that waste management today is an incomplete system, no one will push for reform, and people that are will have a hard time pushing in through to policy.

Currently, the most universal way of waste management is through landfills. However this form of waste management is extremely problematic for a variety of reasons, the first being environmental. As Rootes notes, “ill-managed rubbish dumps and landfills [produce] stenches and vermin ranging from rats and flies to seagulls” (820,). This issue became more apparent as landfills grew in size and quantity.

Another environmental problem created by landfills is groundwater and
soil pollution through the toxicity of the leachate produced. This toxicity was first noticed through fish kills and the deaths of crops and trees (Rootes 821). Lastly, as seen with Puente Hills, our nations landfills are almost at full capacity. While there have been searches for new sites to create landfills, we are running out of room in general, and other practices for waste management such as incineration has been met with resistance as well (Rootes).

On October 31, 2013, Puente Hills Landfill, “the largest landfill in the United States that towers as high as a 40-story building” (Scauzillo), closed. With the closer of the landfill, for the first time ever, the majority of Los Angeles’ residents’ trash will has to be buried in Orange, San Bernardino and Riverside counties. Even with the option to dispose of trash in these counties landfills, there is not enough room to bury all of Los Angeles’ trash in these three counties. Thus, the county is eventually planning on “loading waste dumped by residential and commercial garbage trucks from the county’s 88 cities onto rail cars. The trash train will travel 220 miles to an abandoned gold mine in Imperial County known as the Mesquite Canyon Landfill” (Scauzillo). This operation is not planned to start for at least another five years however, thus the City has to think of other ways to decrease the amount of trash produced and ways of disposal.
While all human beings produce waste, they “rarely share the burden of managing garbage and pollution equally” (Pellows 1). As Pellows writes, “Moreover, in most parts of the world, these social groups that consume the most natural resources (environmental “goods”) and create most of the waste and pollution are the least likely to live or work near the facilities that manage those environmental “bads” (Pellows 1). This can be seen in our society today in the way that people of color and people in low-income neighborhoods have experienced greater environmental and health risks than the rest of society. This is because the place where these people live, work and play are constantly environments where their health is at risk (Bullard and Johnson 555). This unequal distribution of environmental and health risks, also known as environmental racism, is nothing new, nor is the push back that these communities are giving over these issues. Since the start of waste management, communities that have experienced the negative aspects of the system have fought back and have attempted to change the way that our trash is handled.

As Pellow states, “Solid waste is a fact of life. Waste production is an unavoidable function of all living organisms. Similarly, cities and civilizations….have struggled with the myriad of problems associated with
garbage disposal and pollution for thousands of years” (1). Currently, the majority of cities in the United face challenges in terms of their solid waste management systems. Cities throughout the country are realizing that their “current systems of disposal are expensive, dirty and short-sighted” (Transforming Trash). Thus, many cities are realizing that they must review their solid waste management systems and create more up to date systems. Many cities are taking a new approach that is beginning to pay more attention to the environment, workers and the community (Transforming Trash; Don’t Waste LA). These cities are working to develop waste management system that “fight climate change, create family-sustaining jobs, and support strong local economies and healthy communities” (Transforming Trash). To create these new systems, these cities are realizing that they need to set standards to hold waste haulers more accountable to so that safe working environments are provided and environmental standards are met (Transforming Trash). Presently, many waste management systems create a slew of issues ranging from environmental to issues surrounding social justice (Pellow; Transforming Trash; Humes).

An example of a new system being explored is the exclusive franchise system. This system would create more accountability from waste haulers to the city, increase environmental standards and improve working conditions for waste workers. In an exclusive franchise system the city would establish different waste
sheds where different hauling companies would then compete to get a bid to haul in these zones. In the United States, the most notable cities with this system are San Jose, Seattle and San Francisco.

In San Jose, within six months of establishing an exclusive franchise system, the recycling rates in the commercial sector tripled (Transform Don’t Trash NYC). This was achieved by providing all businesses with simple recycling guidelines and consistent services. With this new system and higher rates of recycling, San Jose reached 75% diversion at the end of 2013 and is set to be zero waste by 2022 (Transform Don’t Trash NYC). Furthermore, under the new system, older trucks were retrofitted to become clean fleet trucks and workers saw higher wages and better working conditions.

In Seattle, the implementation of an exclusive franchise system resulted in higher standards for trucks and waste management companies in regard to environmental issues. There were also higher standards for workers under which their wages were raised and were also given new health and retirement benefits. In regard to recycling and diversion, after the implementation of an exclusive franchise, Seattle’s recycling rate rose to be above 60% (Transform Don’t Trash NYC).

San Francisco’s waste management system has been an exclusive franchise system for the past 80 plus years (Stevens). The city has been hauling their trash
with Recology since 1932, a waste company created out of 97 different mom-
and-pop operations that banded together (Stevens). This partnership has
resulted in a very efficient and environmentally friendly system as Recology is
extremely committed to achieving zero waste. As this system has been well
integrated into the city, San Francisco boasts the highest recycling rates in the
country, recycling 80% of the waste produced (Transforming Trash). In addition
to increasing environmental standards, the franchise system in San Francisco has
resulted in family sustaining jobs.

Environmental Challenges

The types of environmental issues that cities are facing in terms of waste
management include small diversion rates from landfills, accelerating climate
change and air quality issues stemming from incineration and transfer vehicles
(Don’t Waste LA; Transforming Trash; The World Bank). While the amount of
waste that humans produce has increased exponentially over the years, the
waste industry’s growth has not matched the need for an increase in disposal
facilities, as well as the need for updated recycling and composting facilities
(Louis). Currently, a large number of the major cities in the United States have
recycling rates below the national standard of 34 percent (Transforming Trash).
Across the country, recycling and composting is not readily available and many
companies that claim they sort through and pull out recyclables do not really do
so and everything goes straight to a landfill. Furthermore, in cities where waste is taken care of in the private sector, a myriad of companies tend to service the same areas which leads to overlapping truck routes, in turn polluting the air with toxins and creating noise pollution on the streets where there are multiple haulers (Transforming Trash; Don’t Waste LA; Transform Don’t Trash NYC).

Another solid waste management practice that is hurting our environment is the practice of incineration. When trash is burned, many toxins, some being carcinogens, are released into the air and cause air pollution, which in turn accelerates climate change. (Transforming Trash; Krieg; Rootes; Humes).

Health and Safety Issues

The types of health and safety issues that cities are facing today are effects on health from air pollution and groundwater contamination (Cointreau). The air pollution that the solid waste industry creates can lead to cases of asthma, lung disease and heart disease. In terms of safety issues, these matters tie relate to social justice and workers rights issues as waste management workers have some of the most dangerous jobs in the country (Cointreau; Don’t Waste LA; Transform Don’t Trash NYC) with “the relative risk for accidents [being] 10 times that for all industry” (Cointreau 31). Yet, there is little accountability for those that are in charge of these workers (Don’t Waste LA; Transform Don’t Trash NYC). Waste workers such as recycling sorters and
garbage haulers are not provided adequate training, and there are many that are hurt and even killed on the job due to this lack of training (Don’t Waste LA; Transform Don’t Trash NYC). Their jobs can be physically exerting when they try to get the waste companies to take responsibility for their lack of training they are more likely to be fired than listened to since they are deemed as replaceable (Don’t Waste LA; Transform Don’t Trash NYC; Cointreau).

Public vs. Private Sector

An aspect of waste management that is a point of contention is whether or not waste management should be a public or private good. European counties have shown that there are many benefits to a government run waste management system. For counties such as Bavaria and Hessen, they see waste management as a public good as government intervention creates more accountability and encourages proper waste management at affordable prices (Piasecki and Davis 1987). Furthermore, governments that provide subsidies “naturally tend to assume more control over the activities subsidized to ensure that public money is used to satisfy public objectives” (Piasecki and Davis 115). Public waste management also ensures that all types of waste are accepted, as governments cannot single out what types of waste they want to process. Counties and states that still see waste management as a public good are worried that the private market would not have the flexibility to serve all types of
waste and that the requirement for them to take in waste that is more expensive to process will result in increased illegal dumping.

Currently, the majority of solid waste management facilities are privately owned and operated. There are some cities where private contractors are responsible for 100% of solid waste operations. Allegheny County Pennsylvania is an example of a county where 100% of the municipal solid waste landfills and material recovery facilities (MRFs) are privately owned and operated. Cities and counties where most or all of their solid waste is handled by private contractors, for example Los Angeles and New York City, are realizing that private waste management results in less accountability. With less accountability, environmental needs are not met and there is usually a lack of funds that results in insufficient training for the personnel.

**Historical Context**

*Waste Management: The Beginning*

The evolution of solid waste management systems started in 2000 BC and still continues today. Since the beginning of waste management, the evolution has started with the collection of solid waste and has gone through a transformation of more sanitary methods of collection and disposal along with more regulation. The industry is now shifting to more sustainable practices such as recycling and composting.
While there has been some form of waste management since 2000 BC, the first municipal dumps in the Western World were created in 500 BC by the Greeks (Louis). From then on, the implementation of solid waste management grew alongside the increase in waste. Disease rose with the increase of littered organic waste and the unhygienic ways of disposal. Human and animal wastes, along with animal carcasses, were thrown out in the open, which attracted rodents, vermin and other disease carrying animals (Louis; Pellow). The outbreak of the plague or Black Death in fourteenth-century Europe is linked to the practice of littering organic wastes in the streets, roadways and vacant lots near cities (Louis; Pellow). The European practice of throwing organic wastes into the streets was replicated in early Colonial America. Other practices included using human and animal wastes as fertilizer, using solid wastes as fuel, burning waste indoors in fireplaces or in outdoor bonfires and disposing of the remaining waste in open bodies of water (Louis). These unhygienic practices created cities that reeked from the smell of waste, produced polluted wells and increased death rates from epidemic diseases (Louis). However, in the beginning, the solid waste problem in Colonial America was not of the same magnitude as in Western Europe as cities in Colonial America were not experiencing urbanization as quickly as European cities were. In 1790, only 5.1% of the US population was
considered city dwellers and there were only 24 cities, only two of which populations exceeded 25,000 (Louis).

Waste Management: 1880s-1930s

With the growth of American cities during the Industrial Revolution, the United States began to experience the harsher effects of improper solid waste management (i.e. increased disease, polluted cities and wells) such as Western Europe had. During the times of Colonial America, there were enough land and water resources to dispose of waste outside of the city limits, which kept the United States from having large scale sanitation problems such as there were in Europe (Louis). Yet, as the population increased and cities grew, the amount of empty land began to diminish. Between the years of 1840 and 1920, the urban population grew from 1.9 million to over 54 million people (Louis). With this population boom, the amount of waste produced also grew, which in turn created a large sanitation problem. Because the amount of waste increased so quickly, American cities “lacked organized public works for street cleaning, refuse collection, water treatment, and human waste removal until the early 1800s” (Louis). With the increase of diseases due to these unhygienic practices, the desire to improve public health grew, and during the nineteenth century, water treatment and sewage systems were established (Louis).
This new “solid waste crisis” (Pellow 23) was a critical problem in industrial centers such as Chicago and New York City. Just as in Europe, waste was disposed of nonchalantly, mainly being thrown out into the streets. Due to these unsanitary conditions and improper solid waste disposal, many scholars and political leaders believed that there was a connection between an increase in human disease and the lack of waste management (Louis; Pellow). The work of John Snow, Filippo Pacini and Robert Koch reinforced this theory through their work on the cholera epidemics. All three men believed that the cholera bacterium could be passed person to person, and were known as “contagionists” (Louis). This theory was known as the “filth theory” and is one of the reasons why sanitation and public health were so closely intertwined (Louis).

The most notable ‘anti-contagionist’ was Sir Edwin Chadwick, who’s work stated that the “unsanitary conditions in which the poor lived and worked, contributed to their high incidence of disease, and that filthy, unsanitary conditions, and miasma, were the primary causes of disease” (Louis 308-309).

These unsanitary conditions and the rise in human health issues pushed community members to protest the way that waste was disposed of. Reformers were pressured by the public to create organized municipal sanitation services (Louis), and this public push is essentially what started the establishment of a solid waste management system. The first step taken was to establish an
infrastructure to bring in fresh water and to take out human sewage. The first city to build a sewage and water system was Philadelphia in 1802. Over the next eight decades the amount of these systems grew with there being 136 by 1860 and 598 by 1880 in cities such as Boston and Chicago.

Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, community protests concerning waste collection and disposal practices were “becoming the major purpose of many citizens groups and civic organizations” (Pellow 27) in both Chicago and New York City. Their focus was on better human health through a cleaner city. For example, in Chicago, “the 1800s horse-drawn cars produced a great deal of manure…[producing] 600,000 tons of manure per year” (Pellow 26). Through a push from the community, a new and cleaner way of transportation was introduced. However, one of the new forms of transportation was the steam-driven, smoke producing, commuter train. This new form of transportation garnered much community opposition due to the air pollution that it created, however “the protests were usually focused on single nuisances, such as smoke or waste dumps, so the early environmentalists rarely produced a holistic critique of the root causes of pollution” (Pellow 27).

The process of communities fighting against new waste management systems that polluted their communities until the city or industry rectified these problems is what Pellow calls the movement-policy cycle (29). The city or
industry usually rectified these issues by creating stricter restrictions and regulations or by creating cleaner technologies. For example, in the 1880s and 1890s in Chicago, multiple “improvement associations” (Pellow 27) emerged. These associations aimed to address issues concerning waste disposal and dumping in poor minority communities. As Pellow writes, “There were frequent protests against unsanitary and politically suspect dumping practices in Chicago’s marginal communities” (27). Somewhat surprisingly as they had not been publically or politically involved before, women were some of the most involved activists. They participated in protests against unsanitary and politically suspect dumping practices in Chicago, and framed their involvement as “municipal housekeeping” (Pellow). This way of framing their involvement was important as their place in society was still through a domestic lens. By stating that their community involvement through protests was “municipal housekeeping was a way of extending women’s traditional roles into the public sphere, thus allowing them to engage in politics while doing so within acceptable boundaries” (Pellow 27). Similar to Chicago, women-led community groups in Boston, Duluth and New York City, sought to “obtain new legislation to strengthen waste collection and disposal regimes, pollution standards, and the like” (Pellow 27).
While this community action put the focus on the solid waste management system, attention these systems from the government was not given until the late nineteenth century. Thus, there was not enough funding available for a regional infrastructure. Consequently, solid waste management became a local responsibility, and City Departments of Sanitation were established across the country.

Once waste was stated as a local issue, cities began to face a new problem. Waste hauling could be done one of two ways: hauling could be contracted out to private scavenging companies or there could be a municipal waste management system created (Louis). Thus began the struggle between public accountability and privatization. Those that supported private contracting said that this would promote accountability and protect against municipal government corruption (Louis). Those that supported a municipal waste management system said that private contracting would cheat customers by overcharging for work, and that a municipal system was a public investment in the local economy that could help with job creation (Louis). American cities were split over the two practices, with some cities keeping waste management under municipal control and some beginning to contract work out. For example, in New York City, the contract system was implemented for street sweeping in 1890, while in Chicago waste was still handled by the municipality as the
contract system was seen as corrupt and inefficient (Louis). While American cities were split between public and private control, all cities in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century disposed of waste the same way by either burning or burying it in landfills (Louis).

In the 1920s, America’s waste frontier changed once again. With the growth of the automobile, chemical and electrical industry, America’s economy grew rapidly (Louis). Along with economic growth, city populations grew even more, increasing the amount of waste that was generated. Additionally, the types of waste that were being produced were of different materials, now including more paper, plastic, toxic chemicals and synthetic materials (Rootes; Louis). Thus, municipalities worked to change waste management systems again to match the amount and type of waste that was being produced. New practices of solid waste management included ‘controlled tipping,’ where there was a strict responsibility on local governments for the control of waste collection and disposal in terms of designated sites for waste and ‘sanitary landfilling,’ a method where waste was disposed of in a trench and then covered with soil (Louis).

**Waste Management: 1940s-2000**

In the 1920s, the federal government became more actively involved in local government issues and thus the federal government began to affect solid
waste management (Louis). These influences by the federal government affected the need and want to recycle, an effort which was helped extensively by recycling programs that were distributed in communities across the country (Louis). This national effort to recycle was fostered by the War Production Board (WPB), “established in January 1942 to direct war production and the procurement of materials in World War II” (The Columbia Encyclopedia), and which urged people to recycle paper, glass, metals and fats (Louis). By 1942 the paper recycling system was well established and by 1945 the scrap metal system was too. However, the recycling efforts during World War II were more in response to the effort stimulated by the WPB rather than the hopes to limit the effects that improper waste disposal had on the environment.

An aspect of waste conservation during the war that is largely untold is how recycling was tied to racial aspects of the war. To initiate and celebrate scrap and metal collection during the war, many anti-Japanese sentiments were exploited. Pellow notes that numerous parades were held to raise awareness of scrap and metal recycling through the use of anti-Japanese sentiments and that some of the banners at these parades read: “Turn In Your Jalopy—We’ll send it to the Japs, In Bombs—Shells—Planes—Ships—Trucks—Ammunition, That Will Make Them Yell—”Sorry Please”” (Pellow 42). Using the Japanese as the enemy and to incentivize recycling shows how race, racism and waste management
were complexly linked. Pellow also notes that the US federal waste recovery program was modeled from Adolf Hitler’s Nazi regime. Similar to the waste management plan in Germany where it was compulsory for German citizens to participate, the United States adopted a plan that followed the same structure and “embrac[ed] a curious mixture of conversation, patriotism, and jingoistic nationalism” (Pellow 42).

When the war ended, the effort to reduce the amount of waste, reuse and recycling along with the effort to recycling scrap metal began to decline (Pellow; Louis). This decline in effort was largely due to the fact that in November of 1945 the WPB was terminated. In the following decades of the 1950s and early 1960s, the population, economy and personal consumption patterns began to rise, which led to the “disposal industry” (Pellow). The idea of “use it once and throw it away” (Pellow 43) became the national motto and had clear negative impacts on the environment.

Solid waste was dubbed the third pollution in the 1960s following air and water as the first and second pollutions respectively (Pellow 44). It was given this title because of its harmful environmental impacts and the pollution that it caused. This new title led President Lyndon B. Johnson to call for better systems of waste disposal and waste management, forcing the federal government to
direct its attention to the solid waste issue. In 1965, Congress passed the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 that stated that the act’s intent was to

Facilitate the implementation of environmentally sound solid waste management and resource recovery systems; 2. Provide technical and financial assistance to states, local governments and interstate agencies in the planning and development of these systems; 3. Initiate and accelerate a national research program to develop these systems and provide guidelines and training for their effective implementation” (Government Printing Office).

However, the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 focused more on the disposal of solid waste rather than the system as a whole. It focused on finding ways to dispose of waste in environmentally sound ways instead of the harmful practice of incineration. Yet, it did not acknowledge or focus on the environmental harm that industry and the production of these materials created.

In 1970, fueled by the first Earth Day and the amended Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 (now the Resources Recovery Act), organized recycling began “as a social movement response to the war in Vietnam and the ecological disorganization in urban areas (Pellow 51). Recycling centers were set up on a volunteer basis and did not generate any profit. However, overall recycling was not incorporated into waste management, as it was much cheaper to just dump potential recyclables into landfills. With this shift in focus from forms of waste disposal to recycling and energy recovery, there was a strong state level
response, and “with the federal requirement of state solid waste management plans, funding through planning grants and the designation of a single state agency for solid waste management within each state, there was a proliferation of state agencies and state solid waste management legislation” (Louis). Within five years after the law was created, 44 states had active solid waste management systems. While the federal government had helped implement these programs, the day-to-day activity of the solid waste management system was still a local issue. Within the next few decades there were many acts and laws put into motion in terms of conservation and environmental issues. There was the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (the requirement of environmental impact statements of any facilities on federal land), the Clean Air Act of 1970 (the regulation of emissions from incinerators, landfills and composting sites) and the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 and its 1984 amendment, the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendment (to promote environmental and health protection in addition to conserving valuable material and energy resources) (Louis).

The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 is what created our waste management system today. It created a system that tracked hazardous waste from its creation to its end when it was dumped, as well as established standards for sanitary landfills. Open dumps were no longer
acceptable and regulated. By 1980, after the RCRA’s establishment, “the number of landfills across the country declined by almost 50% relative to 1976” (Louis 317). Under the RCRA, recycling and composting increased and incineration declined.

Additionally under the RCRA, the transition from municipally run solid waste systems to privately owned hauler companies happened. This transformation occurred because the new regulations of the RCRA increased the cost of facility construction and operation (Louis). Due to the new regulations set by the RCRA, technical specialty areas have arisen to address the associated complex design and compliance issues. Thus, because of these specialty areas, which are privately owned, there was a decline in municipal ownership and operation of Municipal Solid Waste Management facilities in the 1980s. Instead, private companies with the technical expertise and the money to build facilities to the provisions of the RCRA became dominant in Municipal Solid Waste Management. This created the unintended consequence that “the privatization of MSWM [was] in the hands of a small number of companies with great influence on this essential public service” (Louis 318).

As the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act focused on the proper disposal and treatment of hazardous wastes after they have been produced rather than recycling and proper treatment within the production process, the
burden of proper disposal was shifted “away from industry and toward consumers and communities—particularly communities where people of color and the working class lived” (Pellow 50). Treatment, storage and disposal facilities began to infiltrate these communities throughout the nation, exposing them to hazardous waste and pollutants caused by the waste facilities. This negative effect of the RCRA spurred the involvement of waste management in the environmental justice movement and started movements concerning how toxins and pollutants were disproportionately experienced by poor communities of color.

The types of issues that supporters of, and those involved with, the environmental justice movement took up were initially issues focused on landfills and hazardous waste. However, the environmental justice movement also “took up and amplified local protests against waste incineration” (Rootes and Leonard). As stated earlier, many disposal sites for toxic waste and other waste facilities were placed in communities that were mainly poor and minority communities. These communities became more aware of the harms of these sites and facilities, and thus began to become more resistant of them. In response, campaigns against current waste practices began to emerge “against a background of increasing public anxiety about the impacts of industrialism and
industrialized agriculture upon the environment and human health…” (Rootes 826).

Some of these events that lead to and strengthened the environmental justice movement were when Martin Luther King Jr. went to Memphis in 1968 to strike with Black garbage workers that were “demanding equal pay and better work conditions” (Bullard and Johnson 556) and when Black residents in Houston fought to keep a sanitary landfill out of their neighborhood. Another event that lead to and helped strengthen the environmental justice movement was in 1978 in Love Canal, a suburb of Niagara Falls. The residents in this town were experiencing “a high incidence of unexplained illnesses, miscarriages and birth defects” (Rootes and Leonard) and realized that this was happening because their homes had been build on and near what used to be a toxic chemical waste dump for 20,000 tons of chemicals. The images of Love Canal after the realization, which were “widely televised images of chemical sludge oozing up through lawns” (Kurtz), raised awareness of issues connected to waste and health. Next, in 1982, in Warren County, North Carolina a PCB landfill triggered residents to protest, which led to over 500 arrests. Furthermore, in the mid 1980s in South Los Angeles, women residents fought against the City of Los Angeles building the city’s solid waste incinerator in a neighborhood that was
“already bearing the burden of toxic waste and abandoned factories” (Matsuoka).

As Rootes and Leonard write, “In 1987 the Commission for Racial Justice published its Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States report which appeared to confirm the extent of dumping in or near minority communities. Charges of environmental racism and the publication of Robert Bullard’s Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality (1990) raised the stakes” (8). Those that were involved in the environmental justice movement partook in protests that were mainly local and not connected to major or national environmental organizations. However, these protests quickly grew and began to connect and network to greater environmental justice protests throughout the country. These protests fought for “the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with the respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies” (EPA).

The environmental justice movement was essentially a combination between the environmentalist movement and the civil rights movement. A key concept of the environmental justice movement was the concept of environmental racism, “a subcategory of the more encompassing term “environmental injustice.”” (Kreig) The term “environmental injustice“ refers to
intentionally targeting minority and low-income communities by exposing them to life-threatening environmental harms, pollutants and poisons, while at the same time keeping the facilities that create these environmental harms out of wealthy mainly white communities. Those that were usually the victims of environmental “bads,” corporate environmental crime or toxic and hazardous sites were most likely African Americans, Latinos, Native Americans, Asians or Pacific Islanders (Lee 42). These demographics were usually the victims because “facilities were often located, sometimes deliberately” (qtd. in Rootes and Leonard), in economically disadvantaged non-white neighborhoods, (Rootes and Leonard 8), thus the environmental movement began to combine with the civil rights movement.

The literature on waste management includes historical pieces on the system and its origins, work identifying community organizing and protests surrounding waste management and their effects, literature on the connection between waste management and environmental injustice and pieces written on the environmental challenges and health and safety issues that waste management is causing today. Through this literature review and historical review, it is seen that the waste management systems throughout the world have been pretty stagnant since the first waste management system. Furthermore, looking at the historical development of the solid waste
management system has helped determine how our waste system came to be today and what aspects need to be targeted. Additionally, the current literature and research on the issue identifies how community groups have impacted waste managements development through community protests and action, especially in regard to the Environmental Justice movement.

While this literature helps situate the system and its current problems, there is not much literature written about cities that have found alternatives to the current waste management system. Furthermore, while much of the literature identifies the problems with the current system there are no alternatives provided. Thus, this paper provides case studies of two cities that are currently revitalizing their waste management systems and providing alternatives to the current system. Through research and analysis of the waste campaigns in Los Angeles and New York City it is shown how coalitions affect waste management policy and what can be recommended to other cities that are looking to update and redevelop their own waste management system.

**Methods**

I conducted case studies of U.S. cities Los Angeles and New York City through policy and content analysis and semi-formal interviews. These two cities were chosen because they are two of the largest cities in the country, meaning they have national influence and other cities look to them to see what they do in
regard to environmental issues such as waste management. As well, they were chosen because of the waste management campaigns that are looking to change the current waste management systems occurring in both cities. The waste management campaign in Los Angeles is one of the first waste campaigns to get so much recognition due to its practices regarding coalition building and being the largest city in the U.S. to adopt an exclusive franchise system. Currently, the waste management campaign in New York City is following in its footsteps and has gained national attention.

The organizations heading the campaigns in both New York City and Los Angeles are a part of Partnership for Working Families, a larger national organization that has been looking at waste management issues across the nation. Thus, there are many similarities between the approaches in the campaigns. However, as the physical and political landscape are different between the two cities, the case studies complement each other and provide different findings. While similarities between the two campaigns are expected, I expected that the goals, strategies and focuses of the campaigns will be nuanced. Furthermore, by focusing on two organizations that function similarly, I will be able to see how this campaign model can be applied to other cities that do not have Partnership for Working Families organizations.
To complete these case studies, I conducted semi-structured interviews with researchers and organizers working on the waste campaigns. A total of seven interviews were conducted, all conducted in person. Each of the interviews lasted about 30-55 minutes. In New York City, Juan Orsillio a researcher at the Environmental Justice Alliance- New York City and Maya Pinto a researcher at the Alliance for a Greater New York were interviewed. In Los Angeles, senior researcher Lauren Ahkim, senior researcher John Gueverra and senior organizer Amardeep Gill all from the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy were interviewed. Additionally, Greg Good, the Director of Infrastructure at Los Angeles City Hall was interviewed. In Oakland, Jennifer Lin an organizer at the East Bay Alliance for a Sustainable Economy (EBASE) was interviewed, however EBASE was no longer working on the campaign, but the information gathered from this interview was used to support my findings from my case studies.

Data and policy analysis was used to fill in gaps and to get more in depth information after the interviews. Policy analysis was also critical as my research dealt with current waste management policies and system overhauls by altering current waste policies. Thus, data and policy analysis of the cities waste policies and the non-profits waste campaign reports was done. Additionally, content analysis was used as a research method. Content analysis of any mention of new
waste plans, the waste campaigns or waste management systems in Los Angeles or New York City in major newspapers was done. The media sources that were used were major publications and news sources such as *The New York Times*, *The Los Angeles Times* and *The Huffington Post*.

The intent of this study is to provide insights into what aspects of the campaigns in Los Angeles and New York City have worked and what aspects have not and to see how coalitions have affected these outcomes. This study also aims to provide suggestions for new waste management campaigns, and the analysis of policy and the campaigns will provide suggestions at the end of this policy and content analysis. This study will be the first to complete case studies of these cities in terms of how community and non-profit coalitions have impacted policy in the waste management sector, and it will be the first to complete a case study of the Don’t Waste LA campaign in Los Angeles.

**Partnership for Working Families Campaign Model**

As previously stated, both of the organizations leading the waste campaigns in Los Angeles and New York City are part of the national network of Partnership for Working Families. Thus, the way that they strategize and build their campaigns is very similar and they utilize a similar campaign approach and model.

This campaign model incorporates research, policy development and
advocacy, community organizing, coalition building, communication and a legal approach to accomplish their goals. This model has proven to result in victories and create lasting social change. The campaigns start with researchers conducting a deep analysis of a sector of industry or a specific company as it is important to “understand the economic sector you are trying to change” (LAANE). This research is important to know what parts of the economy or sector you are targeting as well as to provide an alternative model. When creating an alternative model, research is combined with policy development and advocacy, which provides a power analysis of the political landscape of the sector being changed and an understanding of the policy already in place. Furthermore, through these steps influential players and potential coalition members and leaders are identified.

Based off of the identified leaders and coalition members, community organizers begin to recruit core grassroots organizations, members and leaders from key constituencies. These community organizers work on “strategic deployment of leaders to build further support and provide community voice” (LAANE). This community organizing is also the way that the coalition is built. This aspect of the campaign model is what makes them so successful as the organization’s coalitions are extremely diverse, including organizations varying from faith based organizations to labor unions. The most important aspect of
coalition building however, is that coalition members become an integral part of the campaign and feel as though they are authentically engaged. While some coalitions are built specifically for one campaign, these relationships can have lasting effects and are transferrable to other campaigns.

An often overlooked, but crucial aspect of campaign building is the role of communications and media teams. This team is in charge of “identifying key audiences and targeting message development, messenger training, and materials creation” (LAANE). The work that the communications team does starts long before a campaign is officially launched, as they are in charge of creating the public message of the campaign. When a campaign is officially launched, the way that the message is delivered, how it gets the attention of the key decision makers and how the media is engaged is crucial. This is all the responsibility of the media and communications team.

The last feature of the campaign model is the legal aspect. When researchers are looking at policies that are currently in place, as well as how they wish to adjust the policies, legal teams can provide assistance when there are legal hurdles in the policy process. Furthermore, at the end of the campaign when the policy itself is being developed and implemented, the legal team can provide “a thorough understanding of the legal landscape [that] is required during the policy development stage” (LAANE). During the implementation
stage, legal teams are extremely valuable as “no policy, no matter how well it has been vetted, is immune to legal challenge” (LAANE). When working with a legal team from the beginning these challenges can be anticipated, thus a strategy is in place for anything that could go wrong.

**Case Study: Los Angeles**

In this section I provide a case study of Los Angeles. In doing so, I shed light on the root of Los Angeles’ waste issues through a review of the history of it’s waste management system. This historical analysis of Los Angeles’ waste system, coupled with an analysis of the environmental justice campaigns that occurred around these issues, reveal that the current waste management issues in the City have been a problem since the City’s first waste management system. Additionally, a case study of Don’t Waste LA, a campaign tackling these waste management issues and working to create an exclusive franchise system in Los Angeles to tackle environmental and labor justice issues, is provided.

**Historical Background**

Officially incorporated as a city in 1850, Los Angeles did not have any form of organized waste management until 1890 when the City Bureau of Sanitation was formed (The Center for Land Use Interpretation). Even when the City Bureau of Sanitation was formed, the system was primarily a “solid waste crematory for dead animals and such, to prevent disease” (The Center for Land
Use Interpretation). Like most other cities at the time, Los Angeles’ waste management system was comprised of multiple different types of disposal, ranging from open dumps to incineration to even feeding swine organic and food wastes (War on Waste 157). In the years following World War II, Los Angeles experienced its largest growth, going from the ninth largest city to the third largest city during the 1940. As a result of this growth, the city’s trash problem began to get out of hand as the amount of waste produced increased. By the 1950s and early 1960s, the city of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles county government began to look at waste management as a prominent issue as the current methods of disposal were not adequate.

Furthermore, not only was the amount of waste becoming an issue, but also other environmental healths such as air pollution were rising as problems in Los Angeles. The reason for this being that as the population rose, the amount of people burning their trash in their backyard rose as well. By the 1950s, there were 1.5 million household incinerators being used in Los Angeles County. These “backyard incinerators designed to burn household trash were a major contributor to the smog problem in Southern California” (War on Waste 157). Adding to the problem of air quality was the “2.5 million motor vehicles, 15,000 industries (many of which generated large amounts of air emissions), and 5 million residents” (War on Waste 157). Even though it was clear that the air in
Los Angeles was becoming increasingly dirty, both local and state officials did not immediately respond to these issues as they were afraid if they did so Los Angeles’ growth would slow. In 1943, Los Angeles experienced a consequential environmental event surrounding air pollution known as “Black Monday.” This event was the first environmental event that “capture[d] widespread public attention, anticipat[ing] the concern over the deadly postwar hazard known as smog” (Gottlieb 115). It was not until five years after this event, in 1947 that officials responded. To decrease the negative effects of incineration and to work on the issue of air pollution, “the state legislature empowered counties to establish air pollution control districts (APCDs) to regulate air quality in their designated areas” (War on Waste 158). However, the state legislature’s efforts were not extremely successful in decreasing air pollution and smog as they had a hard time regulating residential and industrial incinerators. It was not until September of 1955 that the County Board of Supervisors “passed an ordinance that amended the fire code and restricted the burning of combustible rubbish in backyard incinerators to specific hours of the day” (War on Waste 158). The ordinance regulated not only when incineration could occur, but also stated that if someone was caught using these incinerators outside of the give times they could be fined up for $500 and imprisoned for up to six months (War on Waste 158). This ordinance started a series of regulations that controlled the use of
backyard incinerators. These regulations helped control air emissions immensely, as air district officials estimated that this type of incineration emitted more than 500 tons of pollutants into the air daily.

Occurring around the same time, the practice of using swine to manage food and organic waste was diminishing. For several decades, Los Angeles had been a part of the largest swine operation in the country, “sell[ing] some of its garbage to a group of hog raisers who ran a large swine farm about 50 miles from the city’s loading site…[selling] upwards of 9 million pounds of pork annually” (War on Waste 158). Originally, the private contractors that were running this swine operation were paying the city to process the waste. However, as the food industry changed and the use of garbage grinders to manage organic and food waste increased, the city soon became obliged to pay the private contractors to take the waste. This change in payment, coupled with the rise of public health issues related to hog diseases, made it so that Los Angeles stop using these swine operations as a way of disposal in 1961.

The year 1961 was not only the year that the city of Los Angeles finished using swine as a way of disposal, but it also a pivotal year in regard to material separation and collection. Starting before World War II, and continued by the war because of a market for reused items, residents of Los Angeles “had engaged in various forms of source separation, reuse, and recycling activities”
Waste collectors came and gathered up the different materials on different days and disposed of them in different places. Waste was generally separated into garbage, food, and organic waste, combustible trash and noncombustible trash. Recyclables were taken care of by a private company that the city contracted with. However, during the late 1950s and exploding during the 1961 mayoral election, this system of collection and disposal was questioned and more harshly criticized over the quality of service, possible connections to organized crime and the quality of management. Sam Yorty, mayoral challenger to the incumbent mayor Norris Poulson, “transform[ed] the issue into a populist appeal against the city’s elites, calling them unresponsive to the needs of residents for a more “efficient,” one-stop solution to the problem” (War on Waste 159).

In the late 1950s and early 1960s the county’s Sanitation Department and the city’s Bureau of Sanitation switched operations to landfills for waste management. This change, coupled with challenger Yorty’s victory, altered the waste management system in Los Angeles to a one-bin collection, no longer with source separation. With the change to a single-bin system, Los Angeles “began its own large-scale sanitary landfill operation: first in Griffith Park near downtown and, shortly thereafter, at two sites in the San Fernando Valley” (War
Simultaneous to the city’s landfill operation, the county began to establish its own landfill sites.

While landfills, specifically sanitary landfills were becoming the “preferred long-term waste disposal strategy” (War on Waste 160), debates over the protection of undeveloped areas began to arise. In the mid-1970s, community and environmental groups began to organize to protect undeveloped areas from becoming transformed into landfills, specifically the Santa Monica Mountains. This movement was “largely upper-middle-class...which was politically effective and well organized” (War on Waste 160), and had a large impact on influencing the Los Angeles City Council on issues such as the coastal preservation and the preservation of open space. These groups not only opposed landfills because of conservation reasons, but they also began to bring to light the negative environmental and health impacts of landfills. They noted that landfills created groundwater contamination as well as released harmful toxic gases, such as methane, that affected the quality of air (War on Waste 160). Thus, in the late-1970s, the debate around landfills changed to include their perceived safety. As a result of these community and environmental groups persistence, the Bureau of Sanitation was eventually pushed into exploring other options for waste disposal. However, the Bureau of Sanitation did not like recycling and reuse options as they deemed them too costly, and while they...
were not thrilled about waste-to-energy options, they began to look into these options as they had no other ideas to turn to.

In the late-1970s and early to mid-1980s, the city of Los Angeles started to seriously consider burning waste for energy and developed a proposal known as the LANCER project. The LANCER project was put into motion in 1984, and the City reserved a 13.3-acre plot of land in South-Central Los Angeles. This plot of land was in an area that “demographically, compared with the county as a whole… [was] young, poor, and heavily minority” (War on Waste 163). The neighborhood’s median age was 23.5 years compared to 30.8 years in the county as a whole (War on Waste 163). The incomes of 40 percent of the residents were below the poverty level, while only 13.4 percent of residents in the county had incomes below the poverty level (War on Waste 163). Most notably was the racial make up of the community, with “52 percent black and 44 percent Hispanic as compared to the county averages of 12 percent black and 28 percent Hispanic” (War on Waste 163). Because of the demographics, officials working on LANCER did not see any of the members of this community being able to organize themselves and fight back against the project.

However, upon hearing about the project and recognizing the negative impacts it would have on their community, an organization of residents that came to be known as the Concerned Citizens of South Central Los Angeles
began to organize around opposing the LANCER project. Furthermore, they began to form alliances with other groups that opposed incineration outside of South Central. These groups included “a “slow growth” West Side coalition of environment and homeowner groups that called itself Not Yet New York and an anti-incineration coalition, the California Alliance in Defense of Residential Environments (CADRE)” (War on Waste 168). These organized groups took proponents of the project by surprise, as they had not expected any fight back. Soon, the perceived negative impacts of the LANCER project such as toxic emissions became one of the prime factors in the debate over the project.

Fierce organizing against the LANCER project was “[successful in fighting] back against powerful industry and business interests and complicated local decision makers, to block an additional polluting facility from being sited in a neighborhood already bearing the burden of toxic waste and abandoned factories” (Matsuoka,). This organization, coupled with the results of a UCLA Urban Planning program report that stated there were environmental and economic uncertainties with the LANCER project, lead to the cancellation of LANCER in June 1987. With the end of LANCER, new forms of waste management had to be explored yet again. Former Mayor Tom Bradley, who had formerly been a supporter of the project, stated that the City might pursue mandatory recycling, however he did not state any specifics. Yet, the politics of
solid waste management were still fraught with difficulties and “[Bureau of Sanitation] officials, along with other waste planners at the county and state level, quietly began to raise another set of scenarios, including talk of long-distance hauling of wastes, other possible new landfill sites, and a scaled-down incineration program, only, of course, after a recycling effort had also been initiated” (War on Waste 183).

While community groups managed to stop the LANCER project, the California Waste Management Board was not ready to give up incineration as an option quite yet. In 1984, they paid $500,000 to Cerrell Associates, a Los Angeles based consulting firm, to distinguish which communities would be the least likely to oppose waste incinerators in their communities. The memo that targeted these communities was titled “Political Difficulties Facing Waste-to-Energy Conversion Plant Sitting,” more commonly known as the “Cerrell Memo.” The report “presented a demographic analysis identifying low-income communities such as Kettleman City, Buttonwillow and areas in Imperial Country as target locations for new waste facilities, and became the lighting rod for the emerging environmental justice movement in California” (Matsuoka). Additionally, the memo stated that communities that were the most likely to oppose and resist incineration facilities in their communities were communities that were college-educated, middle and upper class and professional.
Furthermore, the memo stated that “the siting of major Waste-to-Energy projects will probably always remain a difficult task,” but through political considerations opposition can be changed into community acceptance, as siting is “99% politics and 1% science” (Energy Justice Network). Eventually, as a result of this memo, “of 43 trash incinerators planned for California, the 3 that ended up getting built were in communities of color” (Energy Justice Network).

It was not until 1989, when AB 39 was passed, that Californian cities began to get serious about recycling. AB 39 required all cities in California to “divert at least 50 percent of waste from landfills” (Ju). Starting with AB 39, over the next decade, Los Angeles began to look at their waste system and what they could do in regard to waste management, conservation, recycling and reuse. When issues surrounding jobs in the waste and recycling industry in Sun Valley arose, the government began to become aware and care about problems surrounding the waste industry. By 2007, the city of Los Angeles began to seriously reexamine trash and waste management systems. The city’s plans started to focus on making Los Angeles a zero waste city, a concept and plan where a city aims to reuse and recycle all of its waste. By increasing the level of waste diversion, incorporating bulk waste pick up and recycling services to multi-family and commercial buildings and increasing the budget for public education and awareness, Los Angeles’ created the goal to have 70 percent diversion by
2015 and 90 percent diversion by 2025 (Seldman). Additional goals of the plan included increasing recycling, reducing street impacts and cleaning the air, having fair and consistent customer rates and having superior customer service. As a part of this zero waste plan and as a way to reach the goals that it set, the city began the process of transitioning to a non-exclusive franchise for its commercial and multi-family properties.

While the city was reexamining the waste system, there were no major environmental, labor or non-profit groups that were dealing with this problem in addition to the city. Instead, it was mainly the politicians in the city that wanted to redo the waste management landscape. It was not until about three years later in 2010, that a non-governmental group became involved with the waste issue. In 2010, the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), a non-profit in downtown Los Angeles, began research to start a campaign that would be known as the Don’t Waste Los Angeles campaign. The Teamsters, the National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) and the Coalition had approached LAANE for Clean Air, all previous coalition members of LAANE on other campaigns, about working on a campaign that tackled Los Angeles’ waste industry. LAANE was extremely interested in working on issues in the waste industry as waste industries cannot move around and have to stay where they are, thus they are known as “sticky industries” (Personal Interview, Lauren
Akhim). It was recognized that while the City was currently at 76 percent diversion, under the current system, it was impossible for it to go any further. While the City was working on the current trash issues, they had hit a wall, and alone could not create much change to the politics and the current system. Thus, this new coalition of environmental and labor groups started to push for an exclusive franchise system for commercial and multi-family properties.

**Current System**

When LAANE first started working on changing the waste management system in Los Angeles, Los Angeles county was one of the largest waste markets in the country, generating 23 million tons of waste and recyclable materials, 10 million of which are sent to landfills each year. (Bornstein). Today, the city remains one of the largest waste markets in the country and is responsible for a third of the county’s waste, thus it plays a crucial role in addressing the issue. The City of Los Angeles itself sends around 3.7 million tons of waste to landfills each year with 2.7 million tons of this waste coming from commercial and multifamily buildings (Martinez). Furthermore, the system was creating a myriad of issues concerning jobs, dangers in the workplace, dealing with numerous environmental issues such as air quality violations on behalf of the private waste haulers and accountability for the waste haulers to the city (Bornstein 4).
The waste management system was affecting jobs and the economy when the campaign first started as landfills were closing because they have reached maximum capacity, which created an opportunity for there to be a growth in the recycling industry as it “has the potential to create thousands of new green jobs” (Bornstein 4). For every job at a landfill, there could be ten jobs created at a recycling sorting facility. There was the opportunity for these jobs to be good green jobs with proper training and job standards, however, even though the industry was growing many of the current jobs were low paying.

Current recycling jobs through the City of Los Angeles only pay their employees an estimated $28,000 annually, where landfill employees are being paid $44,000 on average. Furthermore, these jobs are consistently acknowledged as one of the most dangerous jobs in the country and workers face many hazards while on the job. In California, waste workers have one of the highest injury and illness rates, “more than double the rate for private industry overall” (Bornstein 4). Their fatality rates are on par with those of police officers and firefighters, with some of the dangers that they face being needles, toxic waste and dead animals that end up in the waste stream.

A large reason as to why there are so many issues regarding the waste management system is that Los Angeles is currently under an “open market” permit system, which is extremely inefficient. “The City [Los Angeles] is
missing the opportunity to increase revenue, and studies have shown that open markets can lead to unfair and inconsistent rates for customers” (Bornstein 4). At the moment, Los Angeles’ permit system grants waste and recycling collection permits to 125 different waste haulers. With so many waste haulers and without designated collection routes, there are many overlapping truck routes where multiple waste haulers are collecting trash from the same block (Reyes). These overlapping truck routes create environmental harm in additional to economic costs. Furthermore, under this “open market” system, these private waste haulers are able to charge some business and apartment customers much higher rates for similar services. Not only are these private waste haulers making a profit off of unfair rates, but also many haulers understate their gross receipts and it was found that the city was owed $1.3 million (Bornstein 4). With so many different private haulers and with many understating their receipts, the city is tasked with the job to audit over one hundred haulers to make sure that they are being given the money they are owed. Additionally, “at the same time, the City is undervaluing the worth of its waste and recycling market and could be earning more revenue by increasing recycling and improving market efficiencies” (Bornstein 4).

One of the environmental harms that multiple haulers create is in regard to air quality and air pollution. Currently, the private waste haulers that service
Los Angeles’ businesses and large apartment buildings do not have to comply with regional air quality standards and commit some of the largest violations of the state standards (Martinez). What contributes to these air quality standard infractions is that most private waste haulers use older diesel trucks that tend to have low gas mileage and pollute the air when idling and starting and stopping on streets. One the regional level, private waste haulers are exempt from Rule 1193 passed by the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD), which “require[s] solid waste collection vehicles to transition to cleaner-burning or alternative-fuel technologies” (Bornstein 4). “On the state level, the California Air Resources Board implemented the Solid Waste Collection Vehicle Rule, which requires owners to retrofit trucks with diesel emission reduction technologies” (Bornstein 4). However, private waste haulers have not complied with this rule and over the past two years these waste haulers have been responsible for the majority of California’s enforcement cases involving this rule. Furthermore, by failing to increase recycling rates and the continued act of sending tons of waste to landfills, the amount of greenhouse gases emitted is much higher than it should be (Martinez). These environmental issues are one of the reasons that Los Angeles decided to pursue a zero waste plan.

In January of 2011 LAANE released a report titled “Don’t Waste LA: A Path to Green Jobs, Clean Air and Recycling for All,” that publically kicked off
the Don’t Waste LA campaign. This report address all of the issues that Los Angeles’ waste system created and put forth policy recommendations regarding the commercial and multifamily system. The report noted that LAANE believed the best way to address these issues was to create an exclusive franchise system which would provide recycling for all, guarantee fair and transparent hauling rates, create a food waste collection and composting program, improve efficiency, provide adequate training for waste workers, help work towards the City’s zero waste goals and have accountability from the haulers to the city (Bornstein, Reyes).

The executive franchise system was chosen as the proposed new policy in Los Angeles as it is the only way for the goals of both the city and the campaign to be met. Through extensive research of other cities such as San Francisco and San Jose, the researchers at the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy saw the benefits of the exclusive franchise system. With campaign goals such as increasing hauler accountability to the city and working towards labor rights, and city goals such as reaching zero waste through increased recycling rates, the exclusive franchise system was seen as the best option to move forward.

*The Don’t Waste LA Campaign*

*Coalition*
As already stated, the Don’t Waste LA report released in January 2011 jump-started the Don’t Waste LA campaign, which is made up of a coalition of community, environmental, faith and labor organizations. The coalition is made up on 31 different organizations, the most notable amount them being, the National Resource Defense Council (NRDC), the Sierra Club, Coalition for Clean Air, Los Angeles County Federation of Labor, the Teamsters, Mama’s Hot Tamales and Red Hill. This coalition was groundbreaking in the way that it was one of the first coalitions to be comprised of both labor and environmental groups in the country and was the first coalition of this type to be working on waste management issues.

The National Resource Defense Council (NRDC), the Sierra Club and the Coalition for Clean Air all fall under the heading of environmental groups. Both the NRDC and the Sierra Club are national organizations that aim to protect the environment. The NRDC is “the nation’s most effective environmental action group, combining the grassroots power of 1.4 million members and online activists with the courtroom cloud and expertise of more than 350 lawyers, scientists and other professionals” (NRDC Website, About the NRDC). Similarly, the Sierra Club is a grassroots environmental organization that aims to protect the natural habitat and wilderness. A statewide organization rather than national
one, the Coalition for Clean air works to “restore California’s air quality though advocacy, education and outreach” (Coalition for Clean Air Website, About Us).

The environmental organizations are involved with the campaign and are partners in the Don’t Waste LA coalition as they all are striving to create a better environmental and protect our natural resources. Both the NRDC and the Sierra Club have national influence and because of this they are extremely influential coalition partners to have. Both of these organizations not only add to the coalition in regard to their passion to protect the environment, but also through the sheer amount of people they have access to through their member base. Furthermore, the NRDC is a great coalition member to have since the organization brings legal expertise to the coalition, which is important to have when it comes to the policy creation and implementation stage. While the Coalition for Clean Air does not have national influence, the organization is extremely influential throughout California and as Los Angeles is the largest city in the state, the organization is committed to fixing air quality issues there through supporting the Don’t Waste LA campaign.

The Los Angeles County Federation of Labor and the Teamsters are organizations that are part of the labor organizations. The Los Angeles County Federation of Labor represents over 300 unions and thousands of workers throughout Los Angeles County (The Los Angeles County Federation of Labor
Website, About). The organization works to empower workers by helping them “organize themselves into unions, build strong coalitions of labor, community, fair and responsibly businesses, engage in both organizing and political campaigns, elect pro-union and pro-worker candidates and advance public policies that support worker, families and local communities). The Teamsters is a union that is known “as the champion of freight drivers and warehouse workers” (Teamsters Website, Who Are The Teamsters?), however the organization has organized workers in almost every occupation. As the organization is national with many different local chapters, the chapters that are coalition members and supporters of the Don’t Waste LA campaign are the Teamsters Joint Council 42 and Teamsters Local 396.

Both of these organizations are involved with the campaign and are a part of the coalition because of the effect that the current Los Angeles waste management system has had on workers. One of the goals of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor is to rebuild the middle class and fight for good jobs for their workers, thus being a part of this coalition and supporting this campaign works towards accomplishing this goal. Currently, many waste workers do not make a living wage (enough money to be above the poverty line), are not properly trained, are unable to unionize (or are fired if they do) and consistently have the most dangerous jobs in the country. When it comes to waste
management, most people think of the environmental hazards. However, not all realize that people are directly harmed by this system as well. Thus, labor groups that are involved have a desire to improve conditions for their workers, thus they bring a unique lens to the issue of waste management.

Mama’s Hot Tamales and Red Hill Restaurant are notable coalition members as these members are small business owners. Both of these business and their owners are a part of the coalition due to personal negative experiences with the Los Angeles waste management system. At both of these businesses, the ability to recycle was either not offered, cost more or was an inconsistent service. Having small business owners as a part of the coalition makes a difference in way that not only are they an influence in the community because of their contribution through their businesses, but they are also an influence on decision-makers by being part of the local economy. While these two coalition partners are not part of a national or local organization, nor would they be recognized outside of California, their partnership and the narrative that they create has been extremely influential in the Don’t Waste LA campaign.

As seen, the coalition is made up of a variety of different organizations with different focuses and goals. This diversity is what creates a strong, powerful and influential coalition and campaign. This coalition has been working together on the Don’t Waste LA campaign to help Los Angeles reach its environmental
and economic goals through rectifying environmental and labor issues in the current waste management system by implementing policy recommendations put forth by the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy.

**Campaign Goals**

The goals of the Don’t Waste LA campaign focus on getting the city to consider their policy recommendations and change the waste management system accordingly. The ultimate campaign goal is to reconstruct the commercial and multi-family waste and recycling systems by getting the city to adopt a competitive commercial and multifamily waste franchise system, more commonly known as an exclusive franchise system. Through the adoption of this system, there would be recycling for all customers, fair rates and services that encourage recycling, a better food waste infrastructure, designated collection routes, clean collection trucks, higher worker standards and better training, shared accountability between the City and the hauling companies and better enforcement. To reach these goals, the Don’t Waste LA team at LAANE followed the campaign model that was previously stated. Through research and a power analysis of the political landscape, the team at LAANE was able to come up with a set of campaign strategies that would help the goals of the campaign be reached.

**Campaign Strategies**
LAANE’s first campaign strategy was to identify both supporters and opponents and actively involve supporters of the campaign. Along with the support from coalition partners, there were community members, small business owners, and neighborhood councils that supported the Don’t Waste LA campaign. These community partners supported the campaign by speaking about their personal experiences with the waste system in Los Angeles at press conferences, during public comment in City Council and by speaking to others in the community to gain their support for the campaign.

At the beginning of the campaign, Triple A hauling, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), the Apartment Association of Greater LA (AAGLA), and local hospitals all were initially concerned about the exclusive franchise proposal. Other opponents were hauling companies and landlords. However, Triple A hauling eventually realized that they would do better in a system that ensured high standards and since they had good practices, they would be competitive for a franchise zone. In regard to hospitals, they eventually met with the Bureau of Sanitation to have their needs addressed and currently are no longer opposing the plan.

The MPAA was concerned about the proposed franchise because in their industry, sets are built and torn down and there is on-location shooting 24 hours a day and all over the city. Thus, the MPAA has special requirements for their
hauliers and they were worried that with the new proposed franchise system, they would no longer be able to function as they do now. However, it was realized that set build up and tear down, along with on-location shooting is considered construction and demolition waste, which meant their industry would not be affected by the exclusive franchise system. Furthermore, the Bureau of Sanitation included an accommodation for major studios where they could select a franchisee for their hauler. After this was made clear and the Bureau of Sanitation noted that the accommodation would be laid out in the Final Implementation Plan, as well as in the ordinance, the studios felt as though their concerns had been addressed.

The AAGLA was concerned about rate increases under the new franchise system, as well as recycling fines, and unique buildings. To address their concerns, representatives from LAANE met with the association a number of times to share research that had been conducted that showed that rates would not increase exponentially. During these meetings, there was a focus on education rather than fines, and it was noted that haulers could work with unique buildings to meet their needs without too much of an extra charge. After these meetings, and after it was noted that rates would not increase drastically, the AAGLA stop actively opposing the exclusive franchise system by halting their protests against the system. However, while the AAGLA was no longer
opposing the exclusive franchise system, they did comment on the Environmental Impact Report in favor of dirty Materials Recovery Facilities (MRFing). Fortunately, this has not had an effect on the City in regard to the ordinance and the City is still committed to source separated materials and a three-bin system.

Currently, Councilmen Mitchell Englander and Bernard Parks still oppose this ordinance as they believe it will hurt small hauling companies that will not be competitive enough to get a bid, as well as small businesses who will no longer be able to choose their hauler (Reyes). The only other resistance currently comes from the Los Angeles County Disposal Association and the Los Angeles County Waste Management Association. These industry groups are not outright opposing the ordinance but are worried that the City will not be split into enough franchise zones and they are arguing that the City creates more than 11 zones which would make it easier for small hauling companies to compete (Reyes).

Another aspect that the Don’t Waste LA team had to keep in mind when it came to strategizing was to identify the political targets and the role of the decision-makers of the city. As the goal of the campaign involved policy reform, the targets of this campaign were the 15 members of the LA City Council. As the councilmen and councilwomen are the ones that have the power to approve or
deny this policy, a large part of the campaign is targeting those that are on the fence about approving or denying it, and trying to convince them to approve the policy. There have been numerous tactics and strategies that are being used to convince these councilmen to vote yes. For example, interns working on the Don’t Waste LA campaign went around to small businesses in the districts of councilmen and councilwomen that were unsure of whether or not they would vote to approve the policy and asked these businesses to sign letters of support for the policy. The idea behind this is to show these councilmen and councilwomen that businesses in their districts see this as an important issue that should be remedied by an exclusive franchise system. Other tactics used have been lobbying at city council, going to present at Chambers of Commerce and Neighborhood Councils to get their endorsements and to have those affected by the waste system (for example small business owners, and residents) speak at public comment at city hall. Having the LA City Council be the targets of the campaign can be complicated however. With new elections and changes in power, the campaign has had to re-strategize at times, as well as at points educate and reeducate new City Council members to gain their support.

The Los Angeles mayor was also identified as a target of the campaign. During the duration of the campaign, there were two different mayors in office. For the first 3 years of the campaign the mayor of Los Angeles was Antonio
Villaraigosa, and for the last year of it the mayor has been Eric Garcetti. Changes in power are something that can strongly affect a campaign, thus it is important to look at the shift in power and see how it influenced or affected the campaign.

Former Mayor Villaraigosa was a supporter of the environmental movement and during his time in office he passed and supported GREEN LA, a project that was meant to make Los Angeles the greenest city in the nation and a national leader in regard to climate change and global warming. As Mayor Villaraigosa was supportive of the environmental movement, the Don’t Waste LA coalition did not have to exert a lot of effort to get his support of the campaign.

For the Don’t Waste LA campaign the mayoral change did not negatively affect the campaign and if anything was a positive change. Mayor Garcetti, former Los Angeles councilman for District 13, is in strong support of the Don’t Waste LA campaign and all of the campaigns goals. During his time on City Council, Garcetti voted in favor of all of the votes regarding moving on with the policy recommendations set forth by the Don’t Waste LA coalition. Furthermore, once elected mayor, Garcetti appointed Greg Good, the director of the Don’t Waste LA campaign to be his Director of Infrastructure. Good’s appointment to a position within City Hall in the Mayor’s office sent a message to the city and the decision makers of Los Angeles that Mayor Garcetti was serious about the goals of the Don’t Waste LA campaign and that he supported the suggested
policy.

**Campaign Activity**

The first notable action of the campaign came in November of 2010 when the original motion to explore the exclusive franchise system was introduced. A little over a year later, in December of 2011, hauling companies in Los Angeles were issued legal notices that informed them that the system was in the process of being changed. The first major victory for the campaign came in the following year in November of 2012, when the Los Angeles City Council voted in favor of moving forward to develop and implement an exclusive franchise plan, starting with the Environmental Impact Report. In April of 2013, the full council voted to approve the plan, as well as to have the city attorney draft an ordinance to move forward with implementation. This year, on March 19, 2014, the Energy and Environment Committee unanimously voted that the final ordinance and Environmental Impact Report go to City Council for a final vote.

At just over four years old, the campaign is currently in the policy implementation stage. Most recently, on April 1, 2014, the City of Los Angeles has announced that it is moving forwards with a new waste and recycling system, one that does its best to address the current issues. The ordinance passed into law with a 12 to 1 vote, the one vote against the system coming from Councilman Bernard Parks who was worried about small businesses being
able to survive under the new system. Currently, the Requests for Proposal (RFP) and the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) are being looked at and discussed. Additionally, the Los Angeles City Attorney is looking over the final ordinance and preparing it to become a law. This process will be happening through May of 2014, and once these are completed the city will be ready to implement the policy. It is expected that the policy will be implemented in January of 2017.

**Case Study: New York City**

In this section I provide a case study of New York City through the presentation of the historical background of the waste management system, specifically focusing on the environmental justice campaigns starting in the 80s and 90s. I show how these environmental justice campaigns, focusing on race and class issues surrounding waste management, are the historical roots to the current campaigns surrounding waste and waste management in New York City. I additionally provide a case study of the current campaign, Transform Don’t Trash NYC, which is working to revitalize the waste management system in New York City, focusing on borough equity.

*Historical Background*

Waste management in New York City has always been a point of contention. For decades, politicians, community members and environmental and labor groups have been working on the city’s waste issue. Like most of the
United States in the 1800s, New York City’s streets were littered with trash, as there were no proper forms of removal. Trash was thrown into streets, open dumps and into the ocean. Publically, New York City residents were becoming infuriated with the issues of trash removal and clean up, and in “1860, [they] became outraged by the garbage problem when a newborn baby was devoured by a rat in Bellevue Hospital” (Sze 49). Vermin were a common problem in New York City as they fed off of the trash that was left in the streets. It wasn’t until 1881 that “the New York City Department of Street Cleaning was created in response to the public uproar over litter-lined streets and disorganized garbage collection” (NYC Recycles). This department was later renamed the Department of Sanitation in 1933. Before this department was created, the New York City Police Department was responsible for trash collection and waste management along with their regular duties.

America’s first incinerator was built in New York City in 1885 on Governor’s Island as a way to eliminate improper forms of waste removal. Incineration became a common way of managing waste and “throughout the next century, incinerators [were] the main source[s] of waste management in New York City, burning almost 1/3 of the city’s trash” (Manevich). In 1895 Commissioner George Waring implemented a waste management plan and the city’s first recycling program that “eliminated ocean dumping and mandated
recycling” (NYC Recycles). This recycling program was not only meant to eliminate improper forms of waste removal, but also to improve waste management and to increase recycling. Part of Waring’s plan dealt with separating household waste into three different categories of food waste, rubbish and ash. “Food waste was steamed and compressed to produce grease and fertilizer; rubbish from which paper and other materials were recovered; and ash, which was landfilled along with nonmarketable rubbish” (Manevich).

Unfortunately, due to labor and material shortages that were a result of World War I (NYC Recycles), New York City’s recycling programs came to halt. Additionally, ocean dumping was reinstated.

Throughout the late 1880s and early 1990s, the Department of Sanitation built 22 incinerators and 89 landfills (NYC Recycles). One of these being the Fresh Kills landfill opened on Staten Island in 1947. Additionally within the decades following the 1880s, “the first mass-production trash collection trucks with built-in compactors [were] introduced” (Manevich), which increased not only the capacity of waste trucks but also the efficiency of waste collection. The introduction of these compacting trucks made it possible for trash to now be carted to further places, increasing the amount of places a landfill could be built.

The location of these new facilities, primarily lower-class minority neighborhoods, as well as the quality of services brings to light “how race and
class have historically inflected the politics of urban land use development that have coalesced under the banner of environmental racism and attempts to remediate these conditions through environmental justice action” (Sze 28). For example, even with the creation of a Department of Sanitation and laws that worked towards keeping the streets clean both locally and nationally, implementation and regulation was not consistent everywhere. The largest differences between the areas that were kept clean and those that were not seemed to be class and race. Many lower class minorities believed that “the Sanitation Department practiced discrimination by providing unequal services: three pick-ups each week in black areas but five days in predominately white communities” (qtd. in Sze 50).

In response to this environmental racism, there was an uprising of environmental justice activism in the 1980s and 1990s. This activism focused on the noxious waste facilities (incinerators and treatment plants) that were being built in lower income minority neighborhoods. The four campaigns that occurred during these two decades, gone into detail later, were campaigns against the Bronx-Lebanon medical waste incinerator, the North River sewage treatment plant, the Brooklyn Navy Yard incinerator and the Sunset Park sludge treatment plant. Each campaign was lead by a community-based organization, these being the South Bronx Clean Air Coalition, West Harlem Environmental Action, the

The Bronx-Lebanon medical waste incinerator was originally meant to be sited elsewhere in Rockland County, however the right permits had not been acquired and it was then scheduled to open in downtown Manhattan. However, strong community opposition made it virtually impossible to site it there. Thus, the medical waste incinerator ended up in the Bronx, where the majority of the population was low-income minority families. Additionally, the incinerator was built just blocks away from 2,300 units of schools and public housing (Sze 63-64).

Opening in 1991 the incinerator was met with strong community backlash by an alliance of groups made up of the South Bronx Clean Air Coalition (SBCAC), the Riverdale Committee for Clean Air (RCCA), and the North Bronx Clean Air Coalition (NBCAC) (Sze 64). These groups were angered by the incinerator being placed in their neighborhood because of the negative health effects it caused in their communities. Sze quotes a the past chairman of the SBCAC Carlos Padilla when he states, “What angers me is that some want to get the better of life at the expense of others, including their health. Profit at my children’s expense makes me angry” (Sze 65). This community not only experienced the negative effects of the incinerators, but also bore the brunt of many other environmental harms brought on by being “the city’s most
concentrated transportation infrastructure” (Sze 69), with the Bruckner Expressway, the Major Deegan Expressway, the Sheridan Expressway, the Cross-Bronx Expressway, the Willis Avenue Bridge, and the Third Avenue Bridge all running around or through their community. Prompted by anger that the pattern of environmentally harmful facilities were seemingly only being placed in poor minority neighborhoods and the feeling that the government did not care about poor or hazardous development unless it involved a wealthy, mainly white neighborhood, this coalition of environmental groups severely opposed the incinerator and partook in a number of actions to show their opposition. While all of these actions contributed to the incinerator being closed, the turning point of the campaign was a rally on May 5, 1997 in opposition of the incinerator. This was seen as the turning point of the campaign as this act “provided a major impetus for Senator Alfose D’Amato and Governor George Pataki to take a stand” (qtd. from Sze 74). Through these actions and persistence, the incinerator was closed in 1998 with the smokestacks being taken down in 1999.

In 1991, Mayor Dinkins announced that the Brooklyn Navy yard incinerator would be build, even though he had made a campaign pledge to create an incinerator moratorium. This pledge had won him an endorsement from the Satmar Hasidic community, one of the communities that now would be affected by the proposed incinerator. According to Sze, “the Brooklyn Navy
Yard has long been a symbol of racial exclusion and discrimination” (75). The majority of the residents in the neighborhood came from the ethnic groups of the Satmar sect of Hasidic Jews, and Latinos, primarily Dominican Catholics and those from Puerto Rican descent. Before the campaign against the incinerator, these two groups had been at odds fighting over land allotment. However, the two groups came together over protesting the building of the incinerator.

This campaign against the Brooklyn Navy Yard incinerator is one of the most successful social campaigns in the past decade as the coalition fought against, and defeated, an administration that was used to getting what it wanted especially in low-income minority neighborhoods. The campaign was a long and complex process that took a decade and involved numerous interests and organizations. The coalition was composed of residents, and organizations including El Puente, a progressive Latino organization, and the New York Public Interest Group (NYPIRG) and was known as Community Alliance for the Environment (CAFE). This coalition came together over the issue that this incinerator would be extremely detrimental to the health of the community as well as the environment. CAFE’s strategy included using research to uncover the money trail behind the incinerator, which showed that “Wall Street investment firms such as Lazard Freres has a direct stake through the issuance of municipal bonds to pay for the construction of the incinerator” (Sze 77). Additionally, it
included public involvement and representation at public hearings and protests and working to influence decision-makers and those in positions of power. Through all of these actions, CAFE was able to delay the progress of the incinerator and it ended up never being built.

While community groups had been protesting the siting of the sewage treatment plant in West Harlem from the day it was announced, the North River sewage treatment plant began construction in 1986. This fierce community opposition continued after construction started as the predominately black and Latino communities in West Harlem where this facility was to be built were worried about air quality issues and foul odors that would result from this facility. While the facility finished construction and became an active treatment plant, “community discontent crystallized into action and became an emerging community-based organization” (Sze 81) that became involved in organizing around health and environmental issues in West Harlem.

Once construction began, the design of the plant was altered and the city eventually decided to not enclose the plant. At the end of construction, the facility had a number of design and construction flaws, which negatively affected the surrounding communities. Not only did these communities have to deal with the odors that were emitted, but many residents also suffered from sickle cell anemia. This negative health impact was a result of excessive levels of hydrogen
sulfide (28 percent higher than normal) being produced by the plant, which resulted in insufficient oxygen flow to cells.

Fueled by their anger over these negative impacts, West Harlem Environment Action (WE ACT) was developed and spearheaded a campaign meant to force the city to fix the facility, lead to better community participation in the future siting and planning decision in West Harlem and position environmental justice as a major political issues. In 1992, WE ACT and the National Resources Defense Council sued the city and its DEP over water and air pollution violations. Two years later in 1993, a settlement was reached that forced the city to reduce the odors from the plant, “called for strict enforcement of corrective actions by the state and the city at the facility, required monitoring, and held that $1.1 million must be given to WE ACT and NRDC towards the establishment of the North River Fund to address a range of community, environmental, and public health issues” (Sze 84). This campaign was significant in the environmental justice movement as it showed how external action could be used in the siting and improvement of the operations of a facility as well as help create “new legal obligations for cities for community-targeted resources” (qtd. in Sze, 84).

The campaign against the Sunset Park sludge treatment plant took place in the early 1990s and the coalition working on this campaign was made up of
Asian immigrants and Latinos. While the coalition was very diverse, all involved were committed to addressing health and environmental concerns. Sunset Park, the neighborhood where the sludge treatment plant was going to be placed, is located on the Brooklyn waterfront. During the 1990s the neighborhood “suffered from decline as a result of macro and micro shifts in population, in particular the emergence of Sunset Park as a Puerto Rican barrio, and changes in the employment industry” (Sze 85). Furthermore, policy changes, zoning designations, the construction of the Gowanus Expressway, redlining, and blockbusting also affected the development of the neighborhood.

While the communities that lived in Sunset Park were more fractured than unified, residents of Sunset Park came together to fight against the facility being built based on worries about perceived health risks created by air pollution. As a large part of the population was already experiencing an increase in asthma due to the building of the Gowanus Expressway, they were not happy about dealing with more construction that would be detrimental to their health. The diverse and multicultural community in Sunset Park was ultimately the reason as to why the facility was not built. Mayor Dinkin’s, the one that proposed the building of the treatment plant, was the city’s first nonwhite mayor, which this population used to their advantage. When running for mayor, Dinkins “centered on his image of the city as a racially diverse “gorgeous mosaic,” (Sze 88) which
contradicted with his policies while in office that essentially contributed to the environmental injustices cause by environmental burdens and risks. Once elected to office, Dinkins appointed people of color to his administration, which this coalition used as a way to reveal these contradictions. By partaking in one-on-one meetings with these administration members, the community of Sunset Park put pressure on them to reject the proposal and in February 1991 Dinkins withdrew the proposal.

Within each of these campaigns, environmental racism, the idea that these noxious facilities were built in these neighborhoods because of their class and race, was promoted by some community-based organization. For these groups, their immediate goal were to “closing the Bronx-Lebanon incinerator, preventing the building of Sunset Park sewage treatment plant and the Brooklyn Navy Yard incinerator, and seeking remediation of the effects of the North River sewage treatment plant” (Sze 51). Additionally, each of these groups hoped to educate their neighborhoods about environmental and political issues, hold accountable elected officials and public agencies, and through the development of their organizations, strengthen community resources. However, at the time, “in the heat of each individual campaign, there was little opportunity to reflect on how these various issues were linked, as activists delved into the particular issues they faced) medical waste, municipal waste, sludge, and sewage) as well
as the complex political terrain (local, state, and federal policy)” (Sze 89). These groups did recognize though how each of their campaigns tackled the issue of environmental racism, and the leaders of these groups went on to form the New York City Environmental Justice Alliance (NYC-EJA) in 1994.

With the uprising of environmental justice activism in the 1980s and 1990s, it is clear to see the connection between environmental racism and waste management. These issues of environmental racism, where low-income and minority neighborhoods bearing the brunt of the health and environmental issues from “the relentless stream of garbage trucks in their communities” (Sze 140), made activists realize that “not all neighborhoods in the city shared equally in the burden of handling solid waste” (Sze 140). Ideally, these community groups hoped for all environmental and health hazards to be shared equally among all of the neighborhoods of the city. This ideal is known as borough equity. The issue of borough equity is still something that is an issue when it comes to waste management today, and can be regarded as the basis for the current waste campaigns in the city. As Sze writes, “Garbage politics in New York City are by their nature complex, contradictory, and messy. It is hard to make simple pronouncements about what falls under the rubric of garbage environmental justice activism as well as its larger meaning, which exists on multiple levels” (Sze 140). While the actions of these groups could be seen as
NIMBYism, it was more than just out of self-interest. These groups were trying to protect their neighborhoods and communities, communities that usually were marginalized when it came to policy and urban renewal.

For example, the actions of the Organization of Waterfront Neighborhoods (OWN), founded by the NYC-EJA, when working towards borough equity could be compared to NIMBYism. However, these “claims of NIMBYism are not equivalent to NIMBY politics by elites in the area of environmental racism claims and within the environmental justice movement” (Sze 116). As an organization, OWN was successful in getting New York City to reconsider the retrofitting of existing marine transfer stations rather than building brand new ones. Additionally, OWN was able to get the city to “endorse two ideas previously ignored in the 1998 plan: the principle of borough equity and that garbage move by rail or barge instead of by diesel trucks” (Sze 140). Furthermore, as Sze writes, “OWN’s larger success was in terms of the politics of representation, broadly defined. It used its disproportionate pollution exposure, especially to air pollution, as a means for community mobilization” (141). The organization was able to involve the community by reconstructing the garbage problem as an environmental health issue that affected mainly communities (especially children) of color. They were also able to compel policy makers and city officials to take a deeper look at the
waste issue by forcing them to “think about who garbage hurts (in this case, local neighborhoods, particularly communities of color) and who it benefits (the multinational garbage corporations)” (Sze 141). By engaging these policymakers in the discussion, OWN was able to start a conversation between their organization, the city and communities regarding waste management and the issues surrounding it such as consumption habits, privatization of services and how the system effects communities in different ways depending on their class and race.

More recently in the past decade, campaigns concerning borough equity have focused on the reopening of the Upper East Side marine transfer station, which is an unused marine transfer station on the East River. If reopened, the facility would be used as a collection point for Manhattan garbage, “which would then be loaded onto barges in the East River for transport to dumps outside the state” (Karni). The reopening of this facility has evoked strong emotions from both the residents living in the area that are against it reopening, and organizations and other residents of New York City that say this is one way to create borough equity and are in favor of reopening the facility. After former Mayor Bloomberg announced that the marine transfer station would be reopened, in November of 2004, residents of the Upper East Side protested, stating that this would have environmental and health impacts on
residents surrounding the transfer station. They rented five garbage trucks to create an impact, and residents chanted and expressed their outrage, one stating “It’s going to be Cancer Ally here” (Ma 2004)” (Sze 207).

However as Sze writes, it is important to take a closer look at their protest. First, the proposal was to reopen a facility that had already been operating at one point, not to build a new one. Furthermore, the reasoning to do so was to lower truck traffic, and thus air pollution, from waste transfer stations located in Brooklyn, the South Bronx, and Queens. Second, as Sze notes, “the reference to Cancer Ally was ironic given the term’s centrality in the national environmental justice movement. Cancer Ally has a particular racial and regional meaning that was erased in this protest” (Sze 207). This protest showed the privilege that these residents had (i.e. the affluence to rent garbage trucks), and how these residents did not realize how communities in Brooklyn, the South Bronx and Queens have to deal with these environmental and health issues on a daily basis, because communities like these on the Upper East Side do not look at who else is affected by their actions and do not “handle their fair share of the city’s garbage” (Sze 207). Without the reopening of the Upper East Side marine transfer station, the majority of the city’s waste would be sent only to “private transfer stations concentrated in a handful of neighborhoods in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens… [with] more than half of the transfer stations in two
areas—north Brooklyn (Greenpoint and Williamsburg) and the South Bronx” (Kelley).

When looking at the demographics of the Upper East Side compared to the demographics of the neighborhoods where the private transfer stations are concentrated it is easy to see the vast difference in racial make up and why there is not currently borough equity when it comes to waste facilities. As can be seen in figures 1.1-1.3, the Bronx is made up of only 27.8 percent whites to 72.2 percent minorities (Blacks, Asians, multiracial and other), Brooklyn is made up of 42.7 percent whites to 57.3 percent minorities and Queens is made up of 39.7 percent whites to 60.3 percent minorities (Crain 211). Comparatively, as seen in figure 2 the Upper East Side is 83 percent white to only 17 percent minorities (3 percent Black, 6 percent Hispanic, 6 percent Asian and 2 percent other), making it have “a higher proportion of white residents than Manhattan and New York City overall” (New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene). Figure 3 gives an overview of the racial make up of New York City as a whole.

Furthermore, according to census data, the communities within roughly half a mile from the transfer stations are moderate-to extremely low-income neighborhoods. More than half of the stations are within the two areas of the Greenpoint and Williamsburg sections of Brooklyn and the South Bronx. “About 73,000 residents with a median household income of $40,200 for 2009 live near
the waste transfer stations in those two Brooklyn neighborhoods, the census figures show; 92,000 people with a median income of $21,000 live near the sites in the South Bronx. By comparison, the neighborhood near the proposed East River transfer station, Yorkville in the Upper East Side, has about 47,000 residents with a median household income of $91,000” (Navarro). The boroughs with the higher percentages of minority residents and lower median household income are the boroughs that are bearing the brunt of the environmental and health issues from waste management facilities being placed only in these communities. Thus, in addition to an out of date system, there is currently borough inequality in regard to waste management.

The out of date, messy system, where multiple different haulers are used for just one block of businesses is “rooted in the New York garbage world’s mafia past” (Keenan). The waste industry in New York City has always been lucrative and not extremely transparent, thus it was an attractive venue for organized crime. The Organized Crime Control Commission, now called the Business Integrity Commission (BIC) was created in 2001 to break into the waste management system and discourage criminal control of the system. Fixed maximum garbage-collection rates to avoid extortion, along with other initiatives to prevent criminal behavior were established by the commission, and these initiatives eventually worked. In January 2013, 32 people were indicated on
federal charges of their influence on the City’s waste management industry.

Among those arrested and indicated were “reputed Genovese family associate Carmine “Papa Smurf” Franco and a recently retired state trooper…Mario Velez, a 20-year-veteran” (Cohen and Bandler). Today, “the mafia no longer dominate [the] commercial waste, and the booming number of haulers [keeps] options plentiful—and trash-collection fees low—for businesses around town” (Cohen and Bandler).

Along with the efforts of the Commission, the close of the Fresh Kills Landfill on March 22, 2001 pushed the New York City government, labor and environmental groups to look more urgently at solutions to New York City’s waste situation. With the closure of the landfill, it was the “first time that New York City [had] no place within the give boroughs to bury or burn it’s garbage” (Manevich). Building off of his plan to reopen the Upper East Side marine transfer station, former Mayor Bloomberg passed the Solid Waste Management Plan (SWMP) in 2006. One of the main goals of this plan was to revitalize the current waste management system through borough equity. In addition to reopening the Upper East Side marine transfer station, the plan proposed to build three new transfer stations, two in Brooklyn and one in Queens. These propositions made it so that borough equity would be created for once and the
problem of waste management would be spread throughout all of New York City’s boroughs.

As Courtney Renken of the Organization United for Trash Reduction & Garbage Equity stated, “The plan aims to reduce carbon emissions from vehicles trucking through other, lower-income, neighborhoods in the outer boroughs...what we want is for every community to have a share of the burden” (Sanders). Additionally, instead of trash being transported solely by trucks, the new plan proposed that trains and barges would be used for transportation as well. When this plan was passed, environmental advocates and community leaders were pleased as they saw it as a more equitable way of disposing of trash.

These environmental justice campaigns show the historical roots of environmental justice campaigns today in New York City occurring around waste and waste management. The most recent protests and campaigns surrounding the reopening of the Marine Transfer Station are still relevant as this process is still occurring and the station has not been reopened yet.

Current System

While environmental justice groups have been working on this issue of borough equity since the 1990s, in the fall of 2013, a non-profit known as the Alliance for a Greater New York (ALIGN) started a campaign that is modeled
after the Don’t Waste LA campaign in Los Angeles. This campaign joined environmental and labor groups that had been working on this waste issue for the past few decades into a coalition. ALIGN’s goal was to create livable cities with safe and healthy communities for New Yorkers to live in. While the City has been doing a lot to work towards these types of communities, “the City has largely overlooked the commercial waste sector, to the detriment of local communities and workers, and to the detriment of the local environment, economy, and the City’s long term sustainability” (Transform Don’t Trash NYC 2). Currently, restaurants, offices and businesses in New York City generate 3.2 million tons of solid waste each year, and over 2 million tons of that waste is buried in landfills or burned in incinerators. Out of the total amount of trash collected in New York City, about 32 percent is transported out of the city by rail, 23 percent by the Sanitation Department collection network and 45 percent by long-haul trucks (Cohen). More than 90 percent of this waste could be recycled or composted, yet the current rate is only about 40 percent (Beekman and Brown).

The private haulers that collect this waste are part of an inefficient and dysfunctional system. This system holds no environmental standards and “excess garbage trucks on the road contribute to some of the worst smog in the country, violations of clean air standards year and year, and intense noise
pollution” (Transform Don’t Trash NYC 2). Thus, because of these environmental infractions and inefficient garbage collection system, New York has earned “the dubious distinction of “America’s Dirtiest City’” (Transform Don’t Trash NYC 2).

Currently, the waste management system in New York City is creating many environmental and environmental justice issues. There are similarities between the issues in New York City and Los Angeles in the sense that the current waste management system is inefficient while also being costly and polluting the environment. The waste management department in New York City lacks oversight of the actions of the private haulers and many of the haulers use dirty diesel trucks, which emit pollutants into the air (Cohen). The amount of pollutants released is increased through overlapping truck routes, as there is no efficient system for waste pick up. Furthermore, there are so many different private haulers that the City is unable to monitor the actions of all of the different waste companies, and thus there is widespread unlicensed activity, which makes “the city [lose] revenue and licensed companies [lose] business to unlicensed haulers” (Transform Don’t Trash NYC 2).

Other environmental problems that the current waste management system in New York City causes are issues concerning pollution from landfills and incineration. As stated previously, only 40 percent of New York City’s waste is recycled. The most common form of waste management for commercial waste
is landfilling and incineration. However, both landfilling and incineration "generate greenhouse gas emissions" (Transform Don’t Trash NYC 3) that contributes to climate change. These emissions then affect the health and livelihood of the residents that live near landfills and incinerators. Instead of heavy reliance on landfilling and incineration, the City hopes to see growth in the recycling industry. Investing in recycling could create thousands of jobs for New York residents which would not only negate the "tremendous opportunity cost of the current system" (Transform Don’t Trash NYC 3), but it would also lower the costs of waste management for both haulers and businesses as there would no longer be high waste export costs.

Also similar to Los Angeles, are the conditions that waste workers have to work in. Currently, workers in the private waste sector earn low wages and work in poor conditions that lack safety standards (Beekman and Brown). The wages that they currently make barely cover their living expenses and they lack both benefits and full-time, permanent jobs. With waste being one of the most dangerous jobs in the country, New York City’s waste workers need to have "secure livable wages, benefits, and improved safety training for workers through their union” (Transform Don’t Trash NYC 2) just as municipal waste workers have now.
An issue that is more unique to New York City due to the way the current waste management system is regards borough equity. Currently, “low-income communities and communities of color are disproportionately burdened by solid waste handling” (Transform Don’t Trash NYC). The majority of waste transfer stations in New York City are in low-income communities and communities of color, and much of the transportation to get waste to these stations goes straight through these communities as well. As the SWMP, mentioned earlier, aims to address the unequal effects of waste management by distributing waste transfer stations more equally between communities as well as replace “long-haul transport of residential solid waste with rail and barge transport to reduce diesel emissions” (Transform Don’t Trash NYC 2), it does not address how commercial waste is managed as best as it can. Without changes to the commercial waste sector, these low-income communities and communities of color will continue to be the communities that suffer the most from the waste management system. They will bear the burden of “negative health impacts, such as asthma, of being exposed to waste truck and facility emissions” (Transform Don’t Trash NYC 2).

In September of 2013, The Alliance for a Greater New York (ALIGN) released a report titled “Transform Don’t Trash NYC: How to Increase Good Jobs, Recycling, and Justice in the Commercial Waste Industry,” similar to the
“Don’t Waste LA” report put out by the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE). This report outlined the various issues that New York City’s waste management system causes today and provided policy recommendations based off of the ones in Los Angeles. New York City is currently looking to adopt an exclusive franchise system, which would “ensure high-road environmental and labor practices, halting the current race to the bottom in the private waste sector” (Transform Don’t Trash NYC 3). The waste haulers that won the franchise would be held to environmental standards where they are expected to “increase recycling rates, reduce truck emissions, and more equitably distribute waste handling across the city” (Transform Don’t Trash NYC 3). Furthermore, the companies would be required to meet labor standards which would improve the safety of waste workers jobs and create good, green jobs in the recycling industry. Additionally, the City would be able to monitor and hold these waste haulers accountable through “reporting requirements and increased City oversight” (Transform Don’t Trash NYC 3).

The Transform Don’t Trash NYC Campaign

Coalition

The Transform Don’t Trash NYC campaign is made up of a coalition of labor, environmental justice, community and other advocates in New York City, who all hope to reform the waste management system in the city. As the
campaign is still relatively new, the coalition is still being built. However, there are already influential players involved, including the Teamsters, New York City Environmental Justice Alliance (NYC-EJA), and New York Lawyers for the Public Interest.

As stated in the Los Angeles case study, the Teamsters are a labor organization that helps workers unionize to improve their working conditions and livelihood. For the Transform Don’t Trash NYC campaign, the local groups involved are the Joint Council 16 and Local 813. Just as in Los Angeles, the Teamsters provide a new lens to look at these waste management issues in the current system and will be crucial in constructing the narrative of this campaign.

The New York City Environmental Justice Alliance (NYC-EJA) is a non-profit group that has “linked grassroots organizations from low-income neighborhoods and communities of color in their struggle against environmental justice” (The New York City Environmental Justice Alliance Website, About Us). NYC-EJA works to empower its members to fight for improved environmental conditions in low-income and minority neighborhoods.

NYC-EJA is a part of the Transform Don’t Trash NYC campaign as they have been working on this issue of trash and the siting of trash locations for decades. However, working as just one organization fighting for environmental justice did not get them very far, thus the organization hopes that by combining
their power with other organizations to form a larger coalition fighting against this issue will prove more successful.

The New York Lawyers for the Public Interest is an organization that hopes to “advance equality and civil rights, with a focus on health justice, disability rights and environmental justice, through the power of community lawyering and partnership with the private bar” (New York Lawyers for the Public Interest Website, About). Similar to the National Resource Defense Council (NRDC) being a part of the Don’t Waste LA coalition, the New York Lawyers for the Public Interest provide the coalition with legal background and information. While they do not have the national influence that the NRDC does, this organization has a strong understanding of the politics in New York City, which will be advantageous for the coalition when it reaches the policy development and implementation stage.

“Through improved environmental standards, labor standards and corporate accountability” (Transform Don’t Trash NYC 3), this coalition hopes to “reduce waste and pollution, create cleaner and healthier communities for all New Yorkers, lift thousands of waste industry workers and their families out of poverty, and create thousands of new, quality jobs in recycling and recycling-reliant industries” (Transform Don’t Trash NYC 3).

Campaign Goals
The campaign goals are very similar to those in Los Angeles as ALIGN referenced the Don’t Waste LA campaign when it was creating its campaign. However, there are also differences, one being that the New York campaign hopes to achieve borough equity and frames their campaign through more of an environmental justice lens.

A specific goal of Transform Don’t Trash NYC is the reopening of the marine transfer station on the Upper East Side. When speaking with Juan Osorio of the New York City Environmental Justice Alliance (NYC-EJA), he noted that the reopening of the Upper East Side marine transfer station has created a lot of conflict considering borough equity, mainly in regard to socioeconomic issues. As the residents of the Upper East Side have a reputation of having a high socioeconomic status, Osorio noted that many of them are opposed to having this marine transfer station reopened, and unlike in poorer communities that have these same oppositions, they are able to do something about it because of the power and money they wield. Thus, as a result of this power and money, many opposing campaigns to the marine transfer station have popped up and are gaining momentum. Much of the resistance comes from residents that believe their health will be compromised by pollution from both the marine transfer station as well as the activities surrounding the station (i.e. an increase in
trucks bringing trash to be sorted). However, these opponents are not considering the fact that many communities have been and are facing these issues on a daily basis.

**Campaign Strategies**

As the campaign model of ALIGN’s is very similar to that of LAANE’s as they are both a part of the Partnership for Working Families network, the campaign strategies of Transform Don’t Trash NYC consisted of also identifying their supporters and opponents on both the community level and political level.

In addition to the coalition partners of ALIGN, residents and community members of neighborhoods that are threatened by new noxious waste facilities, and are currently negatively affected by the current waste management system in New York, are supporters of the campaign. Currently, organizers of the campaigns are trying to gather more support from businesses around the city, as well as other organizations such as Chambers of Commerce and Neighborhood Councils, just as was done in Los Angeles.

While an official power analysis has not been done or publically released, it can be surmised that, similarly to Los Angeles, landlords, apartment associations, some business owners and hauling companies that do not believe they will be competitive in the new system will be opponents of the new franchise plan. For landlords, apartment associations and business owners, and
as David Birderman, vice president for government affairs at the National Solid Waste Management Association noted that the new plan could “reduce the choices that customers have for who their carter is… [and people] are concerned about prices being higher for customer[s] in a franchise situation” (O’Donnell). It will be interesting to see how the opposition fights back to the new proposed plans and see if they voice similar opposition in the same way as opponents did in Los Angeles.

Just as in Los Angeles, the targets of the campaign are the city council members of New York City. These council members are in positions of power to approve or reject any proposed policy. Over the course of the campaign, New York City will see changes in power and those leading the campaign will have to adjust accordingly to make sure they have the support that they need from the right people in power.

New York City has also just seen a change in political power with the appointment of a new mayor, Bill de Blasio. It will be interesting to see how this change in power affects the new Transform Don’t Trash NYC campaign as Mayor de Blasio has been left a lot of unfinished business by former Mayor Bloomberg in regard to the City’s waste management system. While former Mayor Bloomberg was socially liberal and believed supported fixing environmental issues and problems such as the waste system in New York City, he also stalled
progress when he suspended plastic and glass recycling programs for two years. Before the cuts the City’s recycling rate was 20% and a year after the cuts the rate had dropped to 16.8% and has never raised higher than that since. However, former Mayor Bloomberg was the one to pass the Solid Waste Management Plan of 2006 and supported the reopening of the Upper East Side marine transfer station. Mayor de Blasio, former City Councilman for district 39 had also supported the reopening of the marine transfer station and voted in favor of doing so while he had been on City Council. However, since his appointment as mayor, he has been showing some signs of concern and opposition groups such as Pledge to Protect are trying to use this hesitation to get him to say no to continued construction.

Campaign Action

As the campaign is only 6 months old, there have not been many victories in regard to changes in policy. However, community protests such as the one on October 2, 2013 on the steps of City Hall have been productive in showing community support for the campaign. Furthermore, it can be presumed that community support such as these protests helped influence Mayor de Blasio (then a mayoral candidate), to be even more supportive of the issue and campaign. One of the most recent victories, and one that brings great hope for what the coalition can achieve, is the victory of “New York adopt[ing] the
strongest worker misclassification legislation in the country that will help end the
practice of denying over 28,000 truck drivers basic workplace protections”
(ALIGN Website). Additionally, the legislation is holding the trucking industry
responsible for replacing thousand of toxic trucks that are polluting port
communities. While this victory was part of the Clean and Safe Ports campaign
and not the Transform Don’t Trash NYC campaign, the Transform Don’t Trash
NYC coalition helped accomplish this victory and is the start to “taking [the]
fight from the docks to the dumps and organizing to clean up New York’s
commercial waste industry—another highly polluting and exploitative industry”
(ALIGN Website).

Over the course of the next few years it will be interesting to see where
the Transform Don’t Trash NYC campaign goes and what victories the coalition
achieves. It would be beneficial for anyone trying to see the comparisons
between the campaign in Los Angeles and New York City to revisit the New
York City campaign in a few years once the policies have been written and are in
the implementation stages.

Findings

Goals

In both New York City and Los Angeles, the main goal of the campaigns
is to create a more accountable and manageable system for cities through the
implementation of an exclusive franchise system. This system would incentivize haulers to perform at higher standards, create jobs in the waste sector, and protect the infrastructure and natural environment. Based off of research that LAANE completed of cities with efficient, clean and safe waste management systems, such as San Francisco, Seattle and San Jose, it is clear that this system is effective in achieving both environmental and social justice goals revolving around the waste industry. As can be seen in these cities, the exclusive franchise system has been successful in creating a different system that is accountable, clean and does not exploit those that work in the waste sector.

Those that oppose the exclusive franchise system (i.e. smaller waste companies, landlords and hospitals) believe that this system will lead to a monopoly and that the goals of the city can be met with another system. However, it is evident that the exclusive franchise system is the best option for cities looking to improve their waste infrastructure, the environment and enrich their communities. This can be seen in the way that it has effectively been implemented in various cities regardless of their urban landscape. For example, while Los Angeles and New York City are vastly different in terms of both the urban and political landscape, an exclusive franchise system has been implemented in Los Angeles and is seemingly the best option for New York City. Furthermore, this system’s benefits have been proven in San Jose, Seattle and
San Francisco, as each of these cities currently operate under the exclusive franchise system. As can be seen, the cities looking to implement this system, combined with the ones that currently operate under it, create a variety of cities where the exclusive franchise system could work.

One of the advantages of the exclusive franchise system is an orderly collection system with regular pickup schedules where there are fewer trucks on the road. This new system would be extremely beneficial not only to the environment, but also for the communities that are directly affected by the waste industry. Charly Solorzano, a Pacoima Beautiful member and supporter of Don’t Waste LA, has seen the negative effects of multiple waste trucks on her street not only in her community but in her family as well. Solorzano noted that she lived near 14 different landfills and that it was not uncommon for her siblings and classmates to acquire asthma. These health issues were a result of “nearly 50 trash trucks passing through the same small few blocks’ radius in an hour” (Don’t Waste LA Website, Supporters).

Less trucks on the road also positively addresses other environmental issues that are aspects of the campaign’s goals. With increased standards and increased accountability to the city, better diversion plans to meet Zero Waste goals will be created, trucks will more readily meet clean truck standards and there will be recycling for all. While other systems such as a non-exclusive
system and an exclusive system with multiple haulers per waste shed were suggested in Los Angeles, both of these alternative options were rejected as they would not be able to meet the environmental standards the way that an exclusive franchise system would be able to. Under both a non-exclusive system and an exclusive system with multiple haulers per waste shed, multiple haulers would be going to the same area, making it impossible to eliminate overlapping truck routes.

While Los Angeles and New York City share the goal of creating an exclusive franchise system, the historical issues concerning waste management in both cities create unique supplementary goals for each campaign. In New York City, part of the campaign’s focus is on borough equity, a concept that means each borough shares environmental harms equally as each borough contributes to these harms. One of the campaigns goals is to evenly distribute waste facilities throughout the five boroughs, which would lessen the negative health and environmental impacts on neighborhoods currently with facilities that are predominately lower-income and minority neighborhoods. While the campaign in Los Angeles also takes an environmental justice stance, the focus is not as much on the location of waste facilities, but rather on the overall negative health and environmental impacts of the waste industry and how the industry affects low-income minorities in regard to waste worker conditions. Thus, Los
Angeles’ supplementary goals focus more on the labor aspects of the waste industry and system. The campaign is focusing on creating a living wage, better working conditions and more consistent training.

**Strategies**

As shown in the Los Angeles and New York City case studies, unique strategies were used to accomplish these goals. Both of the campaigns have followed similar campaign methods, as the leading organizations are part of the same national network, yet their approach and strategies were varied to match the political and geographical landscape of their city. Additionally, depending on the more specific focuses of the campaign, the strategies had to be altered to match these supplementary goals.

**Community Organizing**

As was noted in the Partnership for Working Families campaign model, one of the most important aspects, as well as one of the most effective parts of this model, is community organizing. As the Alliance for a Greater New York (ALIGN) and the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE) are part of this national network, both organizations utilize community organizing as a strategy. Both campaigns take a grassroots approach by involving the community and working on building awareness in communities that are the most
affected by these environmental and health hazards created by the waste management industry.

In Los Angeles, community organizers targeted who they believed would be the most beneficial for Don’t Waste LA in regard to the issues the campaign was addressing. They decided that involving waste workers who had been injured or unfairly treated in the workplace, small businesses that were unsatisfied with their waste services and community members and residents who had been directly impacted by the poor waste management system would have the most impact on the campaign once actively involved.

Through outreach by both organizers and interns at LAANE, as well as people at other organizations that were part of the coalition, community members and residents of Los Angeles were organized into a supporting group of the campaign. This strategy of organizing workers, community members and residents into a supporting group strengthened the campaign just through the impact of the substantial amount of people seen in City Hall and at protests, press conferences or events supporting Don’t Waste LA.

In New York City, the amount of community involvement has not been as high, due to the fact that the campaign is still fairly new. However, ALIGN has already recognized involving community members as a strong strategy, and currently the organization is utilizing community members for community based
research. Presently, community members are going around to different businesses in the city to see which haulers these businesses use. This is an important research and policy analysis aspect as mapping which haulers businesses use gives policy makers and researchers a sense of where there are overlapping routes. Having these truck route mapped is beneficial for later points in the campaign. For example, in Los Angeles these maps were shown to council members as a visual depiction of the severity of overlapping routes.

In Los Angeles, organizers have involved small business owners in addition to community members. The process of organizing small business owners was similar to the process of organizing community members, and entailed interns as well as community organizers at LAANE to go door to door to gather signatures on letters of support for the campaign from small business owners across the city. These letters were a part of LAANE’s strategy as they were meant to show council members that business constituents in their district do care about the waste issue and have personally been affected by it. This strategy was effective in getting councilmen on the fence to support the policy. In addition to letters of support, the Don’t Waste LA community organizers identified businesses that they felt would be an asset to involve further and spoke to their owners to see if they would be interested in getting more actively involved in the campaign.
For both campaigns, community involvement and empowerment were used as strategies. As the Transform Don’t Trash NYC campaign is still in its first year, the way that the coalition and organizers decide to involve the community will change and will most likely result in more community involvement. In contrast, as the Don’t Waste LA campaign is in its fourth year the focus of the campaign has shifted away from community organizing and is now focused more on policy implementation.

**Education**

While campaigns can occur over a significant period of time, the people that are in power and decision-making positions shift, and different people with different opinions take office. This political change in power can alter the outcomes and progress of campaigns. When new politicians, such as council members and mayors are voted in, they bring a whole new staff along with them as well. This means that with changes in power, people that are unaware of these campaigns and the campaigns status are in City Hall and are in decision-making positions. There is also the possibility that new staff and politicians are against the goals of the campaign, in which case it can be detrimental to the progress of the campaign. As Lauren Ahkim of LAANE noted, the key to not letting the opposition be able to use this time of flux to their advantage is
education. Thus, to combat this backtracking, the strategy of education for these new members can be used whenever there is a shift in power.

When power shifts, one of the most important matters is to reach the key staffers in City Council. As Amardeep, Senior Organizer at the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy noted, the key staffers need to be on board for the campaign to be as efficient as it can be. She noted that in general, when someone new comes into office, leaders and key members of the coalition usually go in and break down what the crucial points of policy are for the staffers and council members themselves. It is extremely important to do research on each of the council members before speaking with them to see what they are passionate about and what is important to them. These elements are then emphasized in meeting with new decision-makers. Depending on what issues concern the council members determines which coalition member should go in and speak with them to make it the most efficient meeting as possible.

Gill also noted that this reeducation after a shift in power is crucial as the opposition usually uses this time as a chance to delay progress and confuse the council members. They accomplish this by bringing up old problems that had been put to rest with old council members. Gill noted that when this occurs, it is up to the coalition members to go in and remind council members what the real facts are. By delivering the hard facts to new council members, as well as putting
in the time to meet with their staffers and make sure they understand what is trying to be accomplished, it is possible to make sure old issues do not come back up when there is a change in power.

It is noted that during campaigns there is always backtracking to a certain extent. To maintain momentum and to have continued success, it is important to understand that you will have to constantly be educating and reeducating those involved. As Greg Good, former Director of the Don’t Waste LA campaign and current Director of Infrastructure for Mayor Garcetti noted, one of the most important aspects of keeping a campaign’s momentum going, especially during times where there are power shifts, is to create a narrative. This narrative with both the community and elected officials is created by being the source of information yourself. By constantly being involved in a moving narrative where new research and information is delivered personally, it is possible to not only keep supporters but also to turn opponents into supporters.

In the case of New York City the mayoral shift resulted in a government that was in support of the campaign just as much as than the past mayor. However, opponents of the reopening of the Upper East Side marine transfer station used this shift in power as an opening to bring up their concerns to Mayor de Blasio who was more willing to listen to them than Mayor Bloomberg had been. As previously mentioned, this strategy of theirs stalled progress of
and raised concerns for the Transform Don’t Trash NYC campaign as Mayor de Blasio began to show some concerns about the reopening of the marine transfer station even though he had voted in favor of it when he had been on City Council. Luckily, the tactics of the opposition were not successful and Mayor de Blasio is still supportive of the reopening of the Upper East Side marine transfer station.

As the campaign is new, the organizers and coalition members of the Transform Don’t Trash NYC campaign have been working on educating and informing the council members on New York City’s waste issues (both environmental and social justice wise) and introducing the proposed policy to the council members. As it is indisputable that there will be some changes in power during the course of the Transform Don’t Trash NYC campaign, it will be interesting to see how organizers at the Alliance for a Greater New York handle these power changes and whether or not they use similar tactics as were used in Los Angeles.

The constant shifts in power also serve as a reminder as to how flexible one must be when running or working on a campaign such as Don’t Waste LA or Transform Don’t Trash NYC. In campaigns such as these, one is always adapting and analyzing the power players in the situation. Different officials respond differently to different tactics and even respond differently to different
constituents or organizations. It is clear that for a campaign to be as effective as it can be, constant power analyses and adjustments must be made.

Coalition Partners

I found that one of the strongest assets of the Don’t Waste LA campaign was a strong, united coalition. The Don’t Waste LA coalition was groundbreaking in the sense that it combined different organizations and groups together that had not worked together before, and at times had actually been very much at odds with each other. While this coalition between environmental and labor groups had been used on a previous campaign of LAANE’s (the Ports campaign), no other organization in the country had combined these groups all together before. The coalition also included community members and small businesses, making it a very powerful coalition.

Building coalitions between labor, environment and community groups is a relatively new way of building coalitions as these groups usually do not work together. However, these groups have recently been collaborating more as these coalitions prove more comprehensive and successful on the whole. As seen through the literature review and background research of previous waste campaigns, organizations that tackled these issues usually worked with like-minded organizations, with environmental groups fighting for air quality and pollution control, community groups working towards more livable communities
and labor groups not partaking in the fight towards better waste systems. While some of these fights produced better outcomes, none were as effective as the campaigns that have operated with a coalition of all of the groups together.

**Community Members**

The Don’t Waste LA campaign included community members through featured profiles of waste workers in Los Angeles that have been negatively affected by the waste industry in their report. These profiles were made up of personal testimonies about how dangerous working in waste facilities is and how usually little to no training is provided (Don’t Waste LA 13). Other community members that were involved were small business owners around the city that had negative experiences with their waste haulers. Furthermore, on the campaign’s website, profiles of different supporters Don’t Waste LA, that include why they became involved in the campaign, are featured. Many of these featured supporters are residents that have been personally affected by the broken waste system.

The Transform Don’t Trash NYC campaign is still in the beginning stages of it’s campaign, thus community involvement has been more in regard to data collection and setting the stage for the issues that the campaign is trying to tackle. In the report that ALIGN released in September 2013, there are profiles on waste workers (most of that live in lower-income minority neighborhoods
such as Harlem and the South Bronx) and residents and community members in neighborhoods where noxious facilities are. These testimonies provide their horror stories involving the waste industry, worker conditions and the environmental and health issues that they have endured in their communities.

Kwhane Bennett, a resident of Jamaica, Queens, as well as a commercial waste hauler, notes how the waste hauling companies he has worked for are shady and “many of them cut corners and break the law to underbid the competition” (Transform Don’t Trash NYC). Bennett explains how when companies begin to cut corners, the worker’s safety is compromised and he recalls a story where a faulty truck once backed over one of his co-worker’s legs and broke it. This truck is still in use today. Echoing these claims that the waste industry is extremely dangerous, John Shehas, another waste worker, notes that on the job, improperly discarded materials have injured both him and his co-workers. These injuries have ranged from getting gashes from sharp objects to chemical burns from paint thinner in his eye. Furthermore, these profiles emphasize ALIGN’s goal of borough equity by providing a testimony from Sarah Martin, a 60 year resident of Harlem. In her testimony, Martin notes that as there is a sewage treatment plant close to her neighborhood, there is a constant stream of truck traffic and commercial waste that has affected her health. Currently, “Sarah
suffers from chronic asthma, and environmental triggers prevent her from leaving her home some days” (Transform Don’t Trash NYC).

In addition to getting community members and workers involved by including profiles on them in the report, as mentioned before, the community is involved through community-based research. In New York City, these community members are completing a surveying project to see what waste hauler businesses use. Currently, in the city, businesses are supposed to display a sticker noting which waste hauler they use. This community project is to see which haulers businesses use and to make note of, and map, overlapping truck routes. Additionally, not all businesses display these stickers, thus community members are conducting a survey throughout the city to see which businesses are actually displaying this sticker, and it they are not, if there is a way to enforce this practice.

**Small Business Involvement**

Some of the most influential coalition members in Los Angeles were the small business owners. Getting them involved in the coalition was heavily utilized in the Don’t Waste LA campaign. In the campaign, Los Angeles businesses that were identified as strong supporters were the owners of Mama’s Hot Tamales in McArthur Park, Stories Books and Café in Echo Park and the owner of both Local in Silverlake and Redhill in Echo Park. These business
owners and their businesses were identified as strong supporters and potential
collection members through one-on-one meetings between the owners and
community organizers. It was common in these meetings for the owners to voice
their dissatisfaction with the commercial waste management system in Los
Angeles, noting that their rates and services were fairly inconsistent. Many small
business owners also noted that recycling was not offered through their waste
hauler, and for those where it was, bins were not delivered on time, if at all, and
pick up was very sporadic and inconsistent. Once identified, these owners
became more involved in the campaign by speaking at both press conferences
and public comment in city hall. Additionally, they were featured and quoted in
press releases having to do with the campaign.

The Don’t Waste LA campaign has emphasized including small
businesses into their coalition as one of their strongest tactics. This is a strategy
that has not been utilized before, and in Los Angeles’ case, has proved
extremely effective. Putting an emphasis on small businesses involvement is
something that can be applied in other cities trying to revitalize their waste
system and start a comprehensive campaign to do so. It seems that New York
City is starting to follow in the footsteps of Los Angeles in regard to involving
small businesses through seeing what waste haulers small businesses have been
using, as was mentioned earlier. Currently though, small businesses are not a part of the Transform Don’t Trash NYC campaign.

**Labor and Environment Together**

Labor and environmental groups forming coalitions together was first used in LAANE’s Ports campaign and is now being used in both Los Angeles’ and New York City’s waste campaigns. While each group is powerful on their own, combined, their strength and influence is even more.

Each group brings different types of supporters to the discussion, which enriches the campaign and its legitimacy. As seen through the background info provided in the case studies, where there are multiple different groups and constituents that are concerned about the same problem, and are all behind the same solution, decision makers are more likely to listen to the proposed solution. The fact that the two groups are so different in regard to what they want, one job growth (usually disregarding the environment) and one focused more on environmental issues and only interested in economical growth when it is green or smart growth, is something that decision makers take note of.

As waste has primarily been regarded as an environmental issue, getting labor involved was a unique idea at the beginning. Additionally, as a result of this new partnership, there were a few tensions between the groups in the beginning, which will be explained next.
Tensions

For the Don’t Waste LA campaign getting the Teamsters to compromise and work with the environmental groups was tough in the beginning as the two groups operated very differently which resulted in many conflicts between the two groups. As was found from studying the Don’t Waste LA campaign, to keep these conflicts from stalling progress during these campaigns, it is important to make common goals between the two clear so the organizations do not loose sign of the end goal that the coalition has agreed upon. At times, there was distrust, disloyalty and hiccups between the different sectors, however the leaders of the organizations and the organization leading the coalition was able to work with these different groups to settle their differences and work through these issues. As can be seen in the case of Don’t Waste LA, there are various tactics that can be used to keep these clashes from happening, most importantly addressing the coalition as a whole and not making any key decisions unless they come from the coalition as a whole. By doing this, it puts each organization on the same level so that no organization’s goals are more important than another.

John Guevarra, researcher at the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy noted that the Teamsters had a hard time adjusting to working with the environmental groups at first as they were used to always getting their way.
However, previous experience working with environmentalists on the Ports campaign helped bridge the differences between the two groups during the Don’t Waste LA campaign (John Guevarra, Personal Interview).

Amardeep Gill, senior organizer of the Don’t Waste LA campaign, gave specific examples of tensions and issues between the environmental and labor groups at the start of the campaign. Regarding movie studio issues, the environmental groups in the coalition wanted to be stricter. As mentioned in the case study, movie studios and the Motion Picture Association of America were two of the largest opponents to the proposed exclusive franchise system. When figuring out whether or not these studios should be given exemptions in the new system, labor groups did not care, as the outcome did not affect them personally. Environmental groups on the other hand did not want to provide them with exemptions, as it would compromise their environmental endeavors. Exempting movie studios from the new ordinance would mean that movie studios could still hire and use whatever hauler they wished to without having to abide by the exclusive franchise zone. The studios wanted these exceptions as many have to set up and take down sets all over the city at all hours of the day and night. Thus, waiting on a hauler on a specific day would make it difficult for these studios. In the end, studios were granted an exemption as their waste was considered construction and demolition rather than commercial waste.
While there can be issues between the groups in the beginning, helping them recognize that everyone is trying to accomplish the same goals in the end and that they will be more effective as a combined force helps alleviates these issues. It is clear that with communication and education between the two groups, these alliances can be formed and they can work together harmoniously.

**Recommendations**

Current campaigns across the country that are addressing outdated waste management policy have not been as successful as Don’t Waste LA in Los Angeles. From analyzing both this campaign and the one in New York City that has just begun, there are a few recommendations as to what I believe other waste campaigns in the country can do to be just as successful. These recommendations, which I elaborate on below, focus on coalition building as well as system and policy overhaul.

**Coalition Role**

As is seen with Don’t Waste LA, coalition building is extremely important for successful campaigns and victories. Thus, I recommend that cities that are addressing waste issues create coalitions similar to the one constructed in Los Angeles. This would involve labor, environmental and community groups all work together to accomplish a common goal. Coalitions make a large impact on
policy making as well as the broader movement regarding environmental justice and the span of people that environmental injustice can affect.

Policy Making

While coalitions themselves do not hold any power to directly change or create policy, they can be very influential in the process to do so. By showing decision-makers involved in changing policy how waste issues affects so many different groups and people, coalitions can steer policy making into a direction that helps all that are involved. Especially when unlikely coalitions are created, such as ones built from labor, environment and community groups, policy makers are more apt to listen to the policy suggestions put forth. Groups that normally did not organize together or have the same goals coming together over a common goal are very effective in regard to policy making. In the case of Don’t Waste LA, policymakers were showed that the current waste management system was unsatisfactory for not one, but many different groups and thus they were more willing to look at the proposed policy of an exclusive franchise system.

The power of coalitions affecting policy was also seen in the early environmental justice campaigns in New York City. The campaign around the Bronx-Lebanon medical waste incinerator showed how community action and public pressure from community organized coalitions could influence policy
directly and force agencies and politicians to acknowledge the problems these communities face. When the public brings these issues to light, it is no longer acceptable for governments to ignore these problems. Effective strategies are one-on-one meetings with decision makers and public protests and rallies. In this way coalitions can affect policymaking and policy reform.

**Broader Movement**

In regard to the broader movement, the coalitions that have formed over these waste campaigns have shown how groups with different goals and worldviews are able to come together over a common goal. These coalitions contribute to the broader movement in the sense that they show how overcoming differences and working together creates a more effective and comprehensive campaign. I recommend that other cities look to Los Angeles and New York City and create similar coalitions as the results have proven to be many. It can be complicated to create these types of coalitions, as historically the three have not always had similar goals or approaches, however the goals of each organization are very similar. While they may not be exactly the same, when analyzed it is seen that these goals complement and reinforce each other. As many of the organizations in the Don’t Waste LA campaign are national organizations, other cities that are looking to build similar campaigns can use
these connections to construct their own out of the local chapters of the national organization that has been involved.

It is not only the successes from these current campaigns that show how diverse coalitions make a large impact. These current coalitions are following a long line of diverse coalitions that have been successful as well, elaborated on in the background section of the New York City case study. As seen in the case of the Brooklyn Navy Yard incinerator campaign, the North River sewage treatment plant campaign and the Sunset Park sludge treatment plant the power of diverse coalitions is very strong and has added to the broader movement of environmental justice. The diverse coalitions that are currently forming around waste management issues are doing the same to add to the Environmental Justice movement in not only relating environmental and social issues, but by building diverse coalitions.

System and Policy Overhaul

In regard to policy and system overhaul, I recommend based off of the case studies of Los Angeles and New York City, and seeing the implementation in San Jose, Seattle and San Francisco, that an exclusive franchise system is explored for any city that is looking to change their current waste policy and management system. Each of these cities is very different in regard to size, urbanization, geography, density and politics, yet each city has implemented or
is going to implement an exclusive franchise system because they have seen it as the best option for environmental, labor and community goals and standards. Out of these cities, San Jose, Seattle and San Francisco have all already implemented an exclusive waste management system, and each city has seen considerable improvements in regard to the environment, workers and communities.

It is clear from the results of each of these different cities that an exclusive franchise could be implemented in most any city across the nation and improvements would be seen. Thus, I recommend that an exclusive franchise system be explored for cities looking to revitalize their waste management systems.

City Role

Even though the idea for an exclusive franchise was introduced by a coalition of community, non-profit and labor groups and not the cities themselves, the cities of Los Angeles and New York City still have a crucial role in regard to approving the system and finalizing it during the policy development stage. As has been mentioned, while coalitions and campaigns can be extremely influential when it comes to policymaking, these organizations and coalitions are not the ones that push policy through and change the law. As was seen in Los Angeles, with a supportive City Council and Mayor, the
exclusive franchise ordinance was passed due to those decision makers who were in support of the ordinance to vocally support it. As was seen at numerous City Council hearings, including the final hearing where the ordinance passed, council members in support of the ordinance strongly voiced their support.

For those decision makers that agree it is time to reassess our current waste management systems across the country, it is crucial that they vocally state their opinions. By doing so, other decision makers can be influenced and it is possible that policy could pass through governments faster.

**Conclusion**

As shown in this paper, the waste systems of most cities in the United States are out-of-date need to be altered to address environmental and worker issues. Many cities in the United States, for example Los Angeles and New York City have created and implemented zero waste plans to address these environmental issues. However, the plans that the cities have created on their own still have gaps, especially in regard to worker health and safety.

This paper was the first to provide case studies of the Don’t Waste LA campaign in Los Angeles and the Transform Don’t Trash NYC campaign in New York City. These case studies illustrated inventive ways that these cities are tackling the waste issue as a whole and creating a system that generate good jobs, vibrant communities and an accountable government. The campaigns
coalitions that are made up of environmental, economic and social justice non-profits, and community members and groups were found to be the most successful aspect of these cities waste campaigns. By combining the power of these groups to accomplish a shared goal was found to be more efficient than when these groups worked alone to accomplish their goals.

Analyzing these campaigns, specifically their strategies and tactics, and comparing the cities political and physical landscape showed that there are aspects of these campaigns that can be used in any city that is trying to alter their waste system. My recommendations are for cities starting waste campaigns to create coalitions made up of environmental, labor and community groups and for cities to change their waste management policies so that these systems are efficient, environmentally friendly and safe for their workers.
Appendices

Figure 1.1: Racial Breakdown of the Bronx

(Source: Crain’s New York Business)
Figure 1.2: Racial Breakdown of Brooklyn

(Source: Crain’s New York Business)
Figure 1.3: Racial Breakdown of Queens

(Source: Crain’s New York Business)
Figure 2: Racial Breakdown of the Upper East Side

(Source: New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene)
Figure 3: Racial Map of New York City

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