Assistant Professor, Economics
Professor Jalil's research interests are in Macroeconomics and Economic History. His current research focuses on the causes and effects of financial crises, macroeconomic policy during the Great Depression, and the effects of monetary and fiscal policy.
- Office: Fowler 223
- Email: email@example.com
- Phone: 323 259-1461
- Curriculum Vitae: CV
- Office Hours: T 3:15-5:00pm; W 6:30-7:45pm
Education: A.B.; Sc.B. Brown University; Ph.D. UC Berkeley
Abstract. There are two major problems in identifying the output effects of financial panics of the pre-Great Depression era. First, it is not clear when panics occurred because prior panic series—lists of when panics occurred—combine panics with other developments in financial markets, fail to distinguish among different types of financial panics, and employ unreliable strategies to identify panics. Second, even if the timing of when panics occurred is consistent with panics having real output effects, establishing the direction of causality is tricky: are panics causing downturns or are downturns causing panics? This paper addresses these two problems (1) by developing a new panic series for the 1825-1929 period—one that rectifies many of the problems of earlier series—and (2) by studying the output effects of major banking panics that the reports of contemporary observers suggest were the result of idiosyncratic disturbances, as opposed to declining output conditions. My paper derives four major empirical findings: (1) major banking panics have large and strongly negative effects on both output and prices, (2) panics were a substantial source of economic instability prior to the founding of the Federal Reserve, (3) on average, downturns with major banking panics were more severe than downturns without them and output recoveries were longer for downturns with major banking panics than output recoveries for downturns without them and (4) panics can have persistent level and trend effects. Moreover, using my new series, I find that much of the conventional wisdom on the causes, effects and frequency of panics of the pre-Great Depression era was based on unreliable evidence—and in particular, on biased and inconsistent panic series.
Monetary Intervention Really Did Mitigate Banking Panics During the Great Depression: Evidence Along the Atlanta Federal Reserve District Border
Abstract. This paper argues that monetary intervention alleviated banking panics during the early stages of the Great Depression. Throughout the course of the depression, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta aggressively intervene to stabilize its banking system. To assess the effectiveness of these policies, I analyze the performance of banks along counties straddling the border of the Atlanta Federal Reserve District. My results indicate that expansionary initiatives designed to inject liquidity into the banking system reduced the incidence of bank suspensions by 32 to 48% in some regions. Moreover, an analysis of the balance sheets of individual Federal Reserve Districts suggests that liquidity intervention did not expend large resources and that a concerted, system-wide interventionist policy response was feasible during the first half of the depression. Thus, the Federal Reserve System committed a major policy mistake by not acting as a lender of last resort to stabilize the country's banking system in the early stages of the depression.
Abstract. This paper derives empirical estimates for tax and spending multipliers. To deal with endogeneity concerns, I employ a large sample of fiscal consolidations identified through the narrative approach. To control for monetary policy, I study the output effects of fiscal consolidations in countries where monetary authorities are constrained in their ability to counteract shocks because they are in either a monetary union (and hence, lack an independent central bank) or a liquidity trap. My results suggest that for fiscal consolidations, the tax multiplier is larger than the spending multiplier. My estimates indicate that whereas the tax multiplier is roughly 3--similar to the recent estimates derived by Romer and Romer (2010), the spending multiplier is close to zero. A number of caveats accompany these results, however.
--Teaching Outside. Intro to Econ.
- Macroeconomic Policy Since the Great Depression (Econ 351)
- Intermediate Macroeconomic Theory (Econ 251)
Since the financial crisis of 2008, the U.S. economy has languished: unemployment has remained elevated, job growth has been anemic, and poverty rates have risen to levels not seen in decades. What should policymakers do to help get the U.S. economy out of this mess?
This course revolves around this question. It does so by analyzing the current macroeconomic policy challenges facing the United States from the vantage point of modern macroeconomics and economic history. Students will read state-of-the-art empirical research in macroeconomics and develop a sense for how macroeconomists conduct research and make policy recommendations. Special emphasis will be placed on exposing students to the major developments of U.S. macroeconomic policy since the Great Depression and on the role of history in guiding contemporary macroeconomic policy decisions and debates. Prerequisite: Economics 251.
This course is devoted to answering the fundamental questions macroeconomists study. Why are some countries rich and others poor? What causes economic growth? Why do we have recessions and what can policymakers do to fight them?
Students will develop a strong understanding of modern macroeconomic theory and empirical macroeconomic analysis. The course will focus on both long-run and short-run macroeconomic issues. Topics include economic growth, income inequality, unemployment, inflation, stabilization policy, government debt and deficits, international trade, exchange rates and financial crises. Special emphasis is placed on developing economic tools and applying those tools to understanding contemporary macroeconomic issues and policy debates. Prerequisite: Economics 102.